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 ABSTRACT 
Reading Hume’s ‘Of the Standard of Taste’: 
Taking Hume Seriously 
by 
KWOK Ka Wing 
Master of Philosophy 
This thesis presents an interpretation of David Hume’s essay ‘Of the Standard of 
Taste’. The most distinguishing feature of this interpretation is the emphasis placed 
on the significance of Hume’s general philosophical position in a faithful reading of 
this philosophical classic. The success of this interpretation will show that Hume’s 
essay should be read as an integral part of his system of philosophy. 
There are three parts in this thesis. The first part is an overview of some key 
aspects of Hume’s philosophy which are relevant to my interpretation. Unlike many 
contemporary philosophers in the analytic tradition, Hume is a systematic thinker. A 
faithful reading of his works should take his general philosophical framework 
seriously. Therefore, this overview of his system serves as the general background of 
the next two parts. 
The second part is a discussion of Hume’s aesthetic thought. More specifically, 
it provides an exposition of his view on beauty and judgements of beauty. This part 
completes the stage-setting for the development of my interpretation, by helping the 
reader form a more specific conceptual framework for understanding Hume’s essay.  
The third part develops an interpretation of ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ according 
to what has been provided in the previous two parts. It starts with an outline of the 
essay, which indicates Hume’s aim in writing it. After that, a few sections are 
devoted to some central elements of the essay. The last section of this part discusses 
four controversies concerning Hume’s essay. These discussions establish the strength 
of this interpretation, or at least, the fruitful prospect of an interpretative project that 
integrates Hume’s essay into his whole system. 
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 Introduction 
 
It is generally agreed that Hume’s ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ is one of the most 
important works in aesthetics. A large literature on this essay emerged in the last 50 
years. Quite a number of insightful observations have been made, but they seem to 
have generated more disputes than agreements. Among these disputes, the one 
concerning the relation between this essay and Hume’s other philosophical works 
seems to be the most fundamental one, though it has seldom been explicitly 
discussed. Earlier discussions tend to treat this essay as a self-standing work; but 
recently, more effort has been made to draw on resources from Hume’s system. The 
reason why this dispute seems to be the most fundamental one is quite 
straightforward—our stance regarding it determines whether we should bring in 
resources from Hume’s major works in understanding the essay.  
In ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, Hume does not employ most of his characteristic 
terminology. This might explain why earlier readings of it tend to avoid importing 
thoughts from his other writings. Another reason might be related to the 
advertisement in the first edition of his Essays, Moral and Political (1741), a later 
edition of which contains ‘Of the Standard of Taste’: 
The READER must not look for any Connexion among these Essays, but 
must consider each of them as a Work apart. This is an Indulgence that is 
given to all ESSAY-WRITERS, and is an equal EASE both to WRITER 
and Reader, by freeing them from any tiresome stretch of Attention or 
application. (E, p. 42) 
However, this advertisement does not seem to be relevant here, as ‘Of the Standard 
of Taste’ was originally published under the title Four Dissertations in 1757, 16 
years later than the advertisement cited above. In one of his 1755 letters to Andrew 
Millar, Hume considers this volume as ‘a fourth less than my Enquiry’ (L 1, p. 223). 
The comparison made here suggests that, perhaps, Hume thinks that the pieces in this 
volume are closer to his Treatise and Enquiries than to his Essays. Although ‘Of the 
Standard of Taste’ was written in haste to substitute for two other essays withdrawn 
from the Four Dissertations (Gracyk 2011), the fact that it was written with this aim 
in mind should show that Hume probably wants it to fit with the style of that volume. 
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 If this is the case, then it is not clear that the Essays’ advertisement should apply to 
‘Of the Standard of Taste’, despite that fact that Hume, soon after the publication of 
the Four Dissertations, decided to insert it among the Essays (L 1, p.247). 
Moreover, although it is true that the writing style of ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ 
is closer to his Essays than his Enquiries, it does not follow that it is intended to be a 
work which performs the same role as other essays. Here, Hume’s distinction of 
metaphysical writing and moral writing is illuminating. While the former aims at 
discovering the ‘hidden truths’ of human nature by a careful analysis of the observed 
human phenomena (EHU 1.2), the latter aims at promoting virtue by bringing people 
to ‘feel the difference between vice and virtue’ (EHU 1.1). Most of the essays 
collected in the original volume of the Essays should be classified as moral writings 
(Immerwahr 1991, p. 10-12). But this does not seem to be the case for ‘Of the 
Standard of Taste’. Hume describes his intention in this essay as ‘to mingle some 
light of the understanding with the feelings of sentiment’ (E-ST, p. 272). It means he 
is trying to use his understanding to analyse and reveal the ‘hidden truths’ of the 
observed phenomena concerning the feelings of sentiment. This is doubtlessly an aim 
of a piece of metaphysical writing. If this suggestion is accepted, then we should 
treat it as a part of his science of human nature, and welcome any interpretation 
which duly acknowledges its theoretical background in Hume’s Treatise and 
Enquiries. 
Motivated by the above considerations, this thesis is an attempt to develop an 
interpretation of Hume’s ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ which significantly emphasises 
its connection with his general philosophical framework. The success of this 
interpretation will show that Hume’s essay should be read as an integral part of his 
system of philosophy. 
There are three parts in this thesis. The first part is an overview of some key 
aspects of Hume’s philosophy which are relevant to my interpretation. Unlike many 
contemporary philosophers in the analytic tradition, Hume is a systematic thinker. A 
faithful reading of his works should take his thoughts in other area of philosophy 
seriously. Therefore, this overview of his system serves as the general background of 
the next two parts. 
The second part is a discussion of Hume’s aesthetic thought. More specifically, 
it provides an exposition of his view on beauty and judgements of beauty. This part 
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 completes the stage-setting for the development of my interpretation, by helping the 
readers grasp a more specific conceptual framework which guides their 
understanding of Hume’s essay.  
The third part develops an interpretation of ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ according 
to what has been provided in the previous two parts. It starts with an outline of the 
essay, which indicates Hume’s aim in writing it. After that, a few chapters are 
devoted to some central elements of the essay. The last chapter of this part discusses 
four controversies concerning Hume’s essay. These discussions should be able to 
show the strength of this interpretation; or at least, the fruitful prospect of any 
interpretative project which integrates Hume’s essay into his whole system. 
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 Part I 
Overview of Hume’s Philosophy 
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 Chapter 1 
Experimental Method 
 
Perhaps it is impossible to appreciate the value of Hume’s philosophy without 
always bearing in mind his methodology. It would not be far from the truth to think 
that Hume’s methodology has shaped his philosophy in every detail. The best 
description of his philosophy is probably found in the subtitle of A Treatise of 
Human Nature—‘Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of 
Reasoning into Moral Subjects’. By ‘experimental method’, Hume has in mind 
something similar to the method adopted by the founders of modern natural science, 
such as Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton; but his version is 
nonetheless different from theirs. Hume’s own illustration of his method can be 
found in the introduction of the Treatise: 
We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious 
observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common 
course of the world, by men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, and in 
their pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected 
and compar’d, we may hope to establish on them a science, which will not 
be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of 
human comprehension. (T Intro. 10) 
Hume thinks that an accurate observation of experience is essential to the 
development of his moral philosophy. We should bear in mind that Hume’s aim is to 
establish a science of human nature, where ‘human’ means what we would nowadays 
call a ‘person’, in contrast to a ‘human being’. The same distinction might also be 
put as that between a moral being and a natural being, and relatedly that between 
moral science and natural science. This science of human nature includes topics 
which fall under today’s branches of philosophy, such as epistemology, moral 
philosophy, philosophy of mind, philosophy of art, philosophy of religion, etc.  
In order to illustrate the role of accurate observations in Hume’s experimental 
method, we might consider how he would discuss a belief which is observed to be 
held by all people. The fact that this belief is so common suggests that our believing 
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 it might somehow be a consequence of a common human nature. Therefore, a 
science of human nature should try to provide an explanation of why this belief is so 
common. Upon analysis, it is possible that this belief is not rationally justifiable, but 
Hume would not thus stop here and ask his reader to abandon this belief; rather, he 
would revise the fact to be explained as that this belief is held by all people despite 
the fact that it is not rationally justifiable. He would try to trace the genesis of this 
belief, and show how common human nature would cause us to believe in it. A 
particular example in Hume’s works is our causal belief.  
The importance of accurate observations is that the comparison of observations 
is required for Hume to discover the regularities in human nature, with which he 
could proceed to formulate his explanation of various phenomena. If the observations 
are not accurate, he would not be able to find out the regularities which truly belong 
to the human nature, and hence his explanation will then be false. An accurate 
observation would involve a careful analysis of the phenomena observed, the result 
of which might show that a belief is not rationally justified. Without a proper 
understanding of Hume’s methodology, his readers might wrongly take this as his 
conclusion, or even treat him as a sceptic who would like to reform the system of 
human knowledge by throwing out all beliefs which are not justified. Such a reading 
of Hume has mistaken what belongs to the starting point of the investigation as the 
end. The real explanation starts rather than ends where an irrational belief has been 
correctly shown to be irrational. A correct interpretation of Hume’s works must 
make sure what the fact to be explained is. 
Hume’s ‘experimental’ method also requires that we should stay within the 
boundary of experience in the development of his science of human nature: 
And tho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as 
possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all 
effects from the simplest and fewest causes, ’tis still certain we cannot go 
beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the 
ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as 
presumptuous and chimerical. (T Intro. 8) 
Although the moral philosopher must attempt to explain the observed human 
phenomena by general principles, these principles should be formed wholly on the 
basis of experience. Thus, he must construct his explanation by using only resources 
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 from experience. The general principles formed can be further generalised and 
reduced to more general ones; but once we have arrived at the boundary set by our 
experience, we should be contented with the simple and general principles 
formulated. Although it would be quite natural for us to search for the ultimate 
reason for such principles, ‘we can give no reason for our most general and most 
refin’d principles, beside our experience of their reality’ (T Intro. 9). This restriction 
applies to every part of his philosophy, including his theory of art criticism. 
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 Chapter 2 
Perceptions of the Mind:  
Impressions, Ideas, and Their Relations 
 
The experimental method is supported by Hume’s view on the limit of experience. 
He thinks that all we can experience are ‘perceptions’ of our mind, which can be 
distinguished into ideas and impressions; and both could also be further 
distinguished into simple and complex: ‘Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas 
are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex are the contrary to 
these, and may be distinguished into parts’ (T 1.1.1.2). Hume observes a 
correspondence between impressions and ideas. They resemble ‘in every other 
particular, except their degree of force and vivacity’ (T 1.1.1.3). If an idea acquires 
enough force and vivacity, it can become an impression. However, since we can have 
a complex impression without the corresponding complex idea, and vice versa, this 
general observation is limited in scope. Only simple impressions and simple ideas 
would always have their correspondents. Together with the observation that simple 
ideas are always preceded by their correspondent simple impressions, Hume 
proposes the copy principle: 
[A]ll our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple 
impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly 
represent. (T 1.1.1.7) 
Since all complex ideas can be distinguished into parts, i.e. simple ideas, and all 
simple ideas are derived from simple impressions, it follows that we cannot have any 
idea which is not ultimately grounded in our experience, and hence we should never 
go beyond experience in our study of human nature. 
It should be noted that complex ideas can be formed by simple ideas in quite 
complicated ways; so there is no straightforward way for us to explicate their 
underlying structure. Hume’s most famous example is our idea of cause and effect: 
Our judgments concerning cause and effect are deriv’d from habit and 
experience; and when we have been accustom’d to see one object united to 
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 another, our imagination passes from the first to the second, by a natural 
transition, which precedes reflection, and which cannot be prevented by it. 
(T 1.3.13.8) 
The idea of cause and effect consists in the idea of a necessary connection. Hume 
realises that the latter could not be derived from any simple impression of the 
objective necessary connection between external objects, as all we can perceive 
through our senses and memory are the impressions of each individual objects, as 
well as their contiguity in time and space, and their constant conjunction. This leaves 
the idea of necessary connection unexplained. Hume ingeniously appeals to the 
habitual transition from one idea to another in our imagination. Such a transition is 
so irresistible that the ideas appear to be connected necessarily—our mind seems to 
be determined to pass from one idea to another. Our reflective impression of the 
determination of this operation in our mind supplies our idea of a necessary 
connection, which in turn constitutes our idea of cause and effect. In this move we 
see that Hume does not require that an idea and its corresponding impression should 
be given the same name (impression of determination vs. idea of necessary 
connection). Also, at least some complex idea, if unanalysed, might conceal its true 
structure and constituents, and hence lead us to falsely believe in something—e.g. an 
objective necessary connection between objects—the impression of which we could 
never perceive.  
Moreover, this example reminds us what exactly Hume is developing in his 
writings. When Hume could not straightforwardly find any corresponding impression 
for a problematic idea, especially when the belief in such an idea is natural and 
fundamental to human beings, he does not simply reject the belief as not rationally 
justified; rather, he reflects on it further, and would not give up until an impression 
which causes us to have such a problematic idea is found. The impossibility of any 
impression of a necessary connection between external objects might satisfy the 
sceptics’ project of rejecting or withholding any idea not justified. In this case, Hume 
agrees that this idea of a necessary connection between external objects is not 
rationally justified. However, this sceptical conclusion could not explain why it is 
natural for us to believe in such idea. For Hume’s project of developing an 
experimental science of human nature, this common mistake is an interesting 
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 phenomenon to be explained, and hence, we might say, for Hume, the sceptics stop 
where his investigation starts. As John Biro (2009) put it: 
This shift of focus from a vain attempt to give a philosophical justification 
of our fundamental beliefs to a scientific account of their origin in the 
operations of our minds, is what Hume, with deliberate paradox, calls a 
‘Sceptical Solution’ to the skeptical challenge. (p. 47) 
It is important for the readers of Hume always to clearly distinguish the ‘skeptical 
challenge’ from his ‘Sceptical Solution’ when such a distinction is present. 
Besides simple and complex, impressions can also be distinguished along 
another dimension: 
As all the perceptions of the mind may be divided into impressions and 
ideas, so the impressions admit of another division into original and 
secondary. This division of the impressions is the same with that which I 
formerly made use of when I distinguish’d them into impressions of 
sensation and reflexion. Original impressions or impressions of sensation 
are such as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the 
constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of 
objects to the external organs. Secondary, or reflective impressions are 
such as proceed from some of these original ones, either immediately or by 
the interposition of its idea. Of the first kind are all the impressions of the 
senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of the second are the passions, 
and other emotions resembling them. (T 2.1.1.1) 
The original impressions are caused by things external to the mind; while the 
secondary impressions arise from the mind’s operations on its acquired impressions 
and ideas.1 This difference has an important epistemological implication. Since the 
causes and effects of secondary impressions are both perceptions of the mind and 
hence both subjectively accessible, this provides a possibility for us to understand the 
nature of the human mind. As a similar access to the causes is lacking in the case of 
other sciences, such as natural science, this might also explain why Hume considers 
his science of human nature as the ‘only solid foundation for the other sciences’ (T 
Intro. 7). A detailed examination of this difference goes beyond the scope of the 
1 As suggested by Owen (2009, p. 76), the terms ‘original’ and ‘secondary’ capture more accurately 
the distinctions, and hence I will only refer to the two categories by this pair of terms hereafter. 
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 present study, so I would like to point out only the implication it has for our way of 
reading Hume. As Hume’s aim is to provide a science of human nature, which 
studies the operation of the human mind, and grounds, rather than being grounded by, 
other sciences, so when we are uncertain whether we have correctly identified 
Hume’s target of investigation, we can check our interpretation by asking whether 
the cause of the target as we interpret him is subjectively accessible or not. If it is not, 
probably the interpretation is wrong. 
Secondary impressions, or simply passions, can be further divided into ‘the 
calm and the violent. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, 
composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, 
grief and joy, pride and humility’ (T 2.1.1.3). This distinction, which concerns the 
‘felt intensity’, should not be confused with that between strong and weak passions, 
which concerns the power of influencing our ‘choices and conduct’ (Penelhum 2009, 
p. 249). The difference between these two distinctions is clear in the case of a settled 
principle of action which has a strong influence on our action, but does not produce 
any sensible agitation (T 2.3.4.1).  
Having discussed the classification of individual perceptions, we should turn to 
the relations between impressions and ideas. Hume distinguishes two meanings for 
the word ‘relations’: 
Either for that quality, by which two ideas are connected together in the 
imagination, and the one naturally introduces the other, after the manner 
above-explained; or for that particular circumstance, in which, even upon 
the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy, we may think proper to 
compare them. (T 1.1.5.1) 
The former is called natural relation; while the latter philosophical relation. There 
are 7 kinds of philosophical relations, which fall into two classes: (a) relations of 
ideas: resemblance, contrariety, degrees in any quality, and proportions in quantity 
or number; and (b) matters of fact: relations of time and place, identity, and 
causation. Relations of ideas are those relations ‘which depend entirely on the ideas, 
which we compare together’, and matters of fact are those which ‘may be chang’d 
without any change in the ideas’ (T 1.1.3.1-2). Here we can already observe that 
matters of fact (as philosophical relations, but not as objective fact) can be freely 
manipulated by the imagination, since the ideas related do not naturally introduce 
11 
 each other, and the relations can be imagined to be different with the ideas held 
constant. 
Compared with philosophical relations, natural relations are much more central 
to Hume’s philosophy. There are three natural relations: resemblance, contiguity in 
time and place, and cause and effect. These relations are also the principles of 
association. Notice that there is a ‘remarkable difference, that ideas are associated by 
resemblance, contiguity, and causation; and impressions only by resemblance’ (T 
2.1.4.3). For Hume, the existence of such associations is strongly supported by the 
regularity exhibited by the otherwise chaotic operation of the human mind. The main 
role played by such an association is that it facilitates the transition from one idea or 
impression to another and the communication of force and vivacity between ideas or 
impressions. If two ideas are associated by any of these principles, the presence of 
one naturally introduces another one. Similarly for the impressions. Hume relies 
heavily on the association of ideas and impressions to explain indirect passions, such 
as love, hatred, pride, and humility. For example, the beauty of someone’s own body 
is pleasurable, and it resembles the pleasurable feeling of pride; also, the owner of 
the body and the object of pride is the same person. In virtue of this ‘double relation’ 
between the ideas of her own body and her pride, the presence of the former causes 
the latter. The transition between ideas or impressions is natural in the sense that it is 
not something we deliberately do, but just happens in our mind. 
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 Chapter 3 
General Rules 
 
The importance of general rules in Hume’s philosophy should be expected, given his 
claim that our adherence to them ‘has such a mighty influence on the actions and 
understanding, and is able to impose on the very senses’ (T 2.2.8.5).2 The formation 
of general rules is explained by custom or habit of the non-rational part of the human 
mind, i.e. its natural ‘tendency to move from an idea one has to another idea linked 
to the first idea by one of the principles of association’ (Biro 2009, p. 48). Taking 
these two aspects together, we can say that human beings have a natural propensity 
to form and follow general rules. Commentators of Hume usually focus on the 
influence of the imagination on our understanding in their discussion of general rules, 
but it should be noted that the passions are also subject to the same influence of 
custom: ‘Custom readily carries us beyond the just bounds in our passions, as well as 
in our reasonings’ (T 2.1.6.8). Anyway, for ease of illustration, I will focus on the 
example of the imagination and its influence on our beliefs. 
The formation and operation of general rules ‘[proceed] from those very 
principles, on which all judgments concerning causes and effects depend’. Hume 
continues: 
Our judgments concerning cause and effect are deriv’d from habit and 
experience; and when we have been accustom’d to see one object united to 
another, our imagination passes from the first to the second, by a natural 
transition, which precedes reflection, and which cannot be prevented by it. 
Now ’tis the nature of custom not only to operate with its full force, when 
objects are presented, that are exactly the same with those to which we 
have been accustom’d; but also to operate in an inferior degree, when we 
discover such as are similar; and tho’ the habit loses somewhat of its force 
2 Whenever Hume makes a certain claim about reason or understanding, that very claim might 
illuminate some aspect of his philosophy which provides that claim, as the science of human nature 
consists in a study of human understanding which is made by human understanding. In particular, the 
claim that our adherence to general rules has an influence on understanding implies that this 
adherence also has an influence on Hume’s philosophy.  
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 by every difference, yet ’tis seldom entirely destroy’d, where any 
considerable circumstances remain the same. (T 1.3.13.8) 
Although this passage focuses on the relation of cause and effect, the other two 
principles of association could also lead to general rules. Simply put, general rules 
are joint products of custom and the principles of association. Their effect is the 
communication of force and vivacity between impressions or ideas, and it depends 
positively on the resemblance between a particular circumstance and the original 
circumstances. That the operation of general rules ‘precedes reflection’ and ‘cannot 
be prevented by it’ has some interesting and important consequences, and I will 
come back to this topic later in this chapter.  
For Hume, general rules influence both the imagination and our judgements. 
Given that all general rules are effects of custom, one might think that custom should 
not operate on the two faculties in contrary manner; but the fact is that the 
imagination may sometimes conflict with our judgements. Hume solves this problem 
by distinguishing between the first and second influence of general rules: 
When an object appears, that resembles any cause in very considerable 
circumstances, the imagination naturally carries us to a lively conception 
of the usual effect, tho’ the object be different in the most material and 
most efficacious circumstances from that cause. Here is the first influence 
of general rules. But when we take a review of this act of the mind, and 
compare it with the more general and authentic operations of the 
understanding, we find it to be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all 
the most establish’d principles of reasonings; which is the cause of our 
rejecting it. This is a second influence of general rules, and implies the 
condemnation of the former. Sometimes the one, sometimes the other 
prevails, according to the disposition and character of the person. The 
vulgar are commonly guided by the first, and wise men by the second. [… ] 
The following of general rules is a very unphilosophical species of 
probability; and yet ’tis only by following them that we can correct this, 
and all other unphilosophical probabilities. (T 1.3.13.12) 
A few points should be noted. First, the first influence of general rules is presented as 
a source of error, or a source of prejudice (T 1.3.13.7). However, as both the first and 
second influence of general rules share the same nature as products of custom, with 
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 the only differences being in the respective objects and levels of generality, the 
second influence of general rules can also be a source of error or prejudice.  
Second, since the act of reflecting on the first influence of general rules is also 
an act of the mind, there should also be ‘third’ or ‘fourth’ or higher influences, each 
taking the one at the preceding level as its object of reflection.  
Third, it seems general rules can be formed on the basis of our own direct 
experiences of the objects connected, as well as indirectly on the basis of other 
people’s reports of similar experience. As long as the relevant sorts of ideas arise in 
our mind, no matter whether they are provided by direct experiences or indirect 
reports, our imagination would be accustomed to make the transition between the 
ideas as a result. Nonetheless, Hume would no doubt hold that the effect of our own 
experiences is generally stronger than that of the others’ reports. 
Fourth, that the second influence of general rules corrects their first influence 
presupposes the uniformity of nature, including human nature. Hume is clearly aware 
of this supposition: ‘all reasonings from experience are founded on the supposition, 
that the course of nature will continue uniformly the same’ (A 13). Indeed, this is 
also presupposed by Hume’s science of human nature, for all reasonings in this 
science, so far as Hume sticks to his experimental method, are also reasonings from 
experience. This supposition is not demonstrable, because its denial is conceivable, 
i.e. possible, and hence its demonstration, if any, could only rely on reasoning from 
experience which has already presupposed it (A 14). As the cause of this supposition 
is our custom (A 15), it might also be a general rule, which is also the ultimate one, 
by which all other general rules are corrected. Perhaps the indemonstrability of this 
supposition of the uniformity of nature explains why Hume considers the following 
of general rules as ‘a very unphilosophical species of probability’. Also, Hume’s 
confession that the following of general rules is the only way we can correct all 
unphilosophical probabilities involved in reasonings from experience marks him 
apart from sceptics who seek an invincible foundation of our knowledge. This aspect 
of Hume’s philosophy imposes a constraint on our interpretation of his writings. 
When we interpret Hume’s discussion of problems which involve general rules, or 
more generally, reasonings from experience, we should not expect our most accurate 
interpretation to be free from attacks based on some weird but nonetheless possible, 
or even actual counterexamples. That is a fundamental character of Hume’s 
15 
 philosophy, and any interpretation which attempts to eliminate it can never be 
faithful. 
Lastly, in connection with the previous claim that the operation of general rules 
‘precedes reflection’ and ‘cannot be prevented by it’, it should be added that both the 
first and second influence of general rules do not require the rules to be explicitly 
formulated. Thomas Hearn thinks that the second influence of general rules has ‘a 
reflective character,’ i.e. ‘they are consciously formulated and adopted’ (1970, p. 
410). I agree with the attribution of a reflective character to the second influence, but 
I believe that this does not imply that the rules have to be consciously formulated, 
although it is more likely to be the case if compared with the case of the first 
influence. As Timothy Costelloe writes: 
Hume can be seen as emphasizing the fact that all rules, whether they arise 
from the imagination or the understanding, have a customary use; both 
influences involve that natural transition from cause to effect, which 
“precedes reflection and cannot be prevented by it.” (2007, p. 10) 
The second influence of general rules is reflective because the mind applies such 
rules reflectively on itself. In order for a person to be aware of the error of the first 
influence of general rules, she might simply attend to a particular operation of her 
mind, and in virtue of the unconscious second influence of general rules, have a 
sense that there is something wrong. She definitely can check her causal reasonings 
without having explicitly in mind all the eight rules proposed by Hume (T 1.2.15). It 
is rather the job of philosophers, or at least those more reflective people, to formulate 
and express the general rules both in their first and second influence: 
Philosophy, on this view, is a particular application of the general capacity 
to express formally the principles that organize common life. The 
difference is that whereas ordinary reflection enables individuals to correct 
errors of judgment, philosophy corrects by discovering principles, 
which … explain the phenomenon in question. (Costelloe 2007, p. 12) 
This concurs with Hume’s analogy between his ‘abstruse and abstract’ philosophy 
and anatomy (EHU 8.8, also T 3.3.6.6). Both of them aim at providing accurate 
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 descriptive knowledge of the complex structure of their object of study, rather than 
attempting to render their object ‘graceful or engaging’ (T 3.3.6.6).3 
In Hume’s thought the influence of general rules is significant for our sense of 
beauty in virtue of sympathy, to which we now turn.  
  
3 Hume contrasts the anatomist with the painter in this analogy. A painter, he suggests, ‘give[s] his 
figure … graceful and engaging attitude or expression’ (T 3.3.6.6). Analogous to a painter is what 
Hume calls a ‘moralist’. A moralist promotes virtuous characters by describing their beauty, so that 
people would be attracted and emulate them.  
Hume stresses the advantage a metaphysician could bring to a moralist, since unless the moralist 
has drawn an accurate line between vice and virtue, she might turn out mistakenly to promote 
characters which are in fact vicious. Therefore, a moralist should have an accurate understanding of 
human nature, so that she would not confound the limit between vice and virtue.  
A parallel line of thought underlies Hume’s ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, in which he tries to 
accurately uncover the true nature of art criticism. If he succeeds, critics should be benefited by this 
essay, as it can allow them to guide people in feeling the beauty of what is truly beautiful. 
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 Chapter 4 
Sympathy 
 
In Hume’s philosophy, ‘sympathy’ does not refer to a particular sentiment; rather, it 
refers to a mechanism which enables us to feel the same passion we observe or 
imagine the others feel. It explains how we can, from an idea of the other’s feeling, 
come to have the same feeling. The process can be explained in four steps.4 First, I 
form an idea of the other’s feeling. In some cases, I directly observe another person’s 
expression of the passion she feels, and form an idea of it. This is possible because of 
the resemblance between every human being. The repeated experiences of my own 
passions and my own corresponding expressions establish certain general 
connections between passion and expression. My mind naturally moves from the 
idea of other person’s expression, which is similar to mine, to an idea of the 
corresponding passion.  
However, it is not necessary that an actual expression should be observed for us 
to form an idea of other people’s feelings—such an idea could also be acquired by 
imagining the situation of other people. In my mind there are many general rules 
formed on the basis of my experiences of various situations and the various 
sentiments they produce. When I imagine the situation of some other people, there is 
an idea of their situation in my mind, and the relevant general rule—which is also in 
my mind—causes my imagination to move from this idea to an idea of the sentiment 
which has been observed to be generally produced by that kind of situation. Thus, we 
can acquire an idea of what sentiment would be produced on those people. Perhaps 
Hume’s real thought is that, when the person affected by the character or object in 
question is present, our impression of her expression, if it agrees with the expression 
which would be caused by the sentiment we anticipate her to have, is just a source of 
extra force and vivacity to be added to our idea of that anticipated sentiment. 
This suggestion seems to be supported by Hume’s illustration of the contrary 
effect of sympathy and comparison on our sentiment (T 3.3.2.5). In his example, 
4 The four-step distinction made here is an amended version of the one presented in Brown (2008, p. 
233). 
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 which is adopted from Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura 2.1-4, we can form an idea of 
‘the miserable condition of those who are at sea in a storm’ merely by thinking of 
such a situation. As he goes on, he tries to show what would follow if our idea of the 
pain of those in danger becomes stronger and more sensible. He first brings in the 
presence of an actual ship at a distance from the shore on which we imagine 
ourselves standing, and observe that the idea of pain becomes livelier. Then, he 
further asks us to imagine the ship to be nearer to us, to the extent that we can clearly 
see how those people on the ship suffer from their miserable fate, in which case the 
painful idea has acquired a force so great that the effect of sympathy overturns that 
of comparison. The role of the direct perception of the painful expressions in this 
example is obviously to add force and vivacity to the idea of pain already formed 
from the beginning. 
It might be objected that the application of my own general rules to other people 
is illegitimate, as people differ in all sorts of ways. They have a different personality; 
they receive a different education; they grow up in a different culture, etc. To extend 
my own general rules to other people is acceptable only when the person in question 
is similar to me enough. In response, we should notice that the application of the 
general rule to the case of other people is not something I do deliberately. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the application of general rules ‘precedes 
reflection’ and ‘cannot be prevented by it’. Whenever a relevant idea arises in my 
mind, the imagination is immediately prompted to move to another idea which is 
connected to the first idea by a general rule in my mind. Of course I can reflect on 
the details of the particular situation, and stand back from believing that the second 
idea should really follow. However, this is the second influence of a general rule, the 
operation of which presupposes that the second idea has already been produced in 
my mind. As the present concern is how such an idea of the others’ sentiment can be 
formed in my mind, rather than whether the formation of this idea is rationally 
justified, this worry is irrelevant. 
On the other hand, perhaps the problem is that the particularities of the situation 
and the people in question do not display sufficient similarity with my experienced 
situation and me. Therefore, the perception or imagination of such would not trigger 
the operation of the general rules in my mind, and hence I could not form any idea of 
the sentiment of those people. Actually, this problem cannot show that in principle 
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 we cannot have the idea of the sentiments of those people. The general rule involved 
in the formation of an idea of other people’s sentiments can be quite general. In order 
for it to be effective, I would need to understand the situation in some general way. 
The particularity of a situation might upon proper understanding be reduced to a 
specific combination of certain general features. With a clear and distinct conception 
of the situation, such general features can be perceived, and their corresponding ideas 
would then set the imagination in motion, and thus provide me an idea of a sentiment 
in accord with a certain general rule. The initial troublesome particularities are thus 
shown to be just a signal of my obscure conception of the situation, a weakness of 
mine which can certainly be cured if due effort is made. 
The second step of sympathy is that the three principles of association, 
especially that of resemblance, apply to the idea of myself and my idea of any other 
human being. There are certain general similarities within the whole species, and 
also some more specific similarities between particular persons. Living in the same 
age or country, friendship, kinship, etc. also contribute to the association. Notice that 
the strength of such relations varies for different persons. 
Third, Hume maintains that:  
’Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always 
intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a 
conception of our own person, that ’tis not possible to imagine, that any 
thing can in this particular go beyond it. (T 2.1.11.4) 
Fourth, in virtue of the principles of association, the force and vivacity of the 
idea of myself is communicated to my idea of the person with whom I am 
sympathising, and in turn to my idea of her passion. Since the only difference 
between an impression and an idea of the same content is their degree of force and 
vivacity, insofar as my idea of the person’s passion has become forceful or vivacious 
enough, it becomes that very passion. A clarification is needed here. That the passion 
thus acquired corresponds to an idea of her passion but not of my passion might lead 
some readers to raise an objection: all passions I feel are my passions, so how could I 
feel another’s passion? Note that the idea of ‘her passion’ is actually a complex one, 
which could be distinguished into simple parts, one of which is a simple idea of the 
passion. This simple idea is shared by the complex idea of my passion and the 
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 complex impression of the other’s passion. What is essential for sympathy is that that 
simple idea of passion can become a passion.  
The importance of sympathy to Hume’s moral philosophy is obvious in his 
Treatise. Simply put, sympathy allows us to adopt the required general viewpoint, 
instead of our own interested viewpoint, to judge a person’s character morally. 
It has been observ’d, in treating of the passions, that pride and humility, 
love and hatred, are excited by any advantages or disadvantages of the 
mind, body, or fortune; and that these advantages or disadvantages have 
that effect, by producing a separate impression of pain or pleasure. The 
pain or pleasure, which arises from the general survey or view of any 
action or quality of the mind, constitutes its vice or virtue, and gives rise to 
our approbation or blame, which is nothing but a fainter and more 
imperceptible love or hatred. (T 3.3.5.1) 
The moral species of love and hatred differ from the personal ones in the 
adopted viewpoint. The object of moral judgements is a person’s character, i.e. her 
behavioural tendency in certain circumstances. The realisation of a tendency depends 
on the presence of certain circumstances, and hence the attribution of a tendency to a 
person does not require this tendency to have an actual opportunity of realisation. 
Furthermore, even if it is realised, it might not have any effect on me, or even if I am 
one of those being affected, the effect might vary for different people. So in order to 
evaluate a person’s character, I need to correct my personal sentiment by adopting a 
general viewpoint: 
’Tis only when a character is consider’d in general, without reference to 
our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as 
denominates it morally good or evil. (T 3.1.2.4) 
In the case of moral judgement, to adopt a general viewpoint is to sympathise 
with those people affected by this character if the requisite circumstances obtain, and 
to share the passion they would have. This correction is actually an instance of the 
second influence of general rules, which is a constraint based on our reflection on the 
operation of our affection.  
One problem concerns us at this point. Different people inevitably stand in 
different relations with those people in the required circumstance. As a result, the 
natural relations connecting a person’s ideas of those affected by the character to a 
21 
 person’s idea of herself vary in strength for different individuals. As these principles 
of association determine the force and vivacity of the passion acquired through 
sympathy, different people will have passions of different degrees of force and 
vivacity, and it seems to follow that the general viewpoint does not guarantee that 
different people will form the same moral judgement, or at least, not the same degree 
of praise or blame. This problem can be solved by pointing out that the second 
influence of general rules is not merely a requirement to correct our sentiment, but 
also to correct our language: 
In general, all sentiments of blame or praise are variable, according to our 
situation of nearness or remoteness, with regard to the person blam’d or 
prais’d, and according to the present disposition of our mind. But these 
variations we regard not in our general decisions, but still apply the terms 
expressive of our liking or dislike, in the same manner, as if we remain’d 
in one point of view. Experience soon teaches us this method of correcting 
our sentiments, or at least, of correcting our language, where the 
sentiments are more stubborn and inalterable. (T 3.3.1.16)  
Hume’s presentation suggests that the correction of sentiment and that of language 
are two different outcomes of the same requirement. This makes the requirement 
quite loose, as one can fulfil it even if her pronounced judgement, which reflects the 
general viewpoint, does not have a corresponding general sentiment as its ground. I 
suspect it would have been better to have separated them into two requirements. 
Anyway, for my purpose in this study, it is sufficient to have shown that the adoption 
of the general viewpoint does not guarantee or require an agreement in the force and 
vivacity of the sentiment actually felt. Merely using language which reflects this 
general viewpoint is already acceptable. 
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 Chapter 5 
Reason and the Passion 
 
Hume distinguishes between two principal parts of human nature, ‘which are 
requisite in all its actions, the affections and understanding; ’tis certain, that the blind 
motions of the former, without the direction of the latter, incapacitate men for society’ 
(T 3.2.2.14). This broad distinction is operative throughout the whole system of 
Hume’s philosophy; however, this distinction was never drawn by him precisely 
enough. ‘Passions’ and ‘sentiments’ should belong to the class of ‘affections’, and 
‘reason’ should belong to ‘understanding’; but Hume does not spell out the 
connection between these terms. For the present purpose, I will just bypass this 
complication.  
In the passage quoted above, Hume refers to the ‘blind motion’ of the affections. 
So what does Hume mean by this figurative description? Hume is pointing to the 
involuntary nature of the operation of the affections. They are produced in the mind 
according to some original principles of human nature. Given a certain stimulus, a 
certain affection follows as a reaction. No conscious and voluntary act of the mind 
could alter such regularities, ‘’tis certain we can naturally no more change our own 
sentiments, than the motions of the heavens’ (T 3.2.5.3). In other words, our passions 
and sentiments are immediately produced by certain external or internal stimuli. 
Moreover, ‘[a] passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of 
existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any 
other existence or modification’ (T 2.1.2.4). Also, motives like desire and aversion 
are passions. 
As for reason, Hume writes: 
Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood. Truth or falshood consists in 
an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real 
existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this 
agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can 
never be an object of our reason. (T 3.1.1.9) 
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 Simply put, reason concerns the truth or falsity of philosophical relations. Recall that 
philosophical relations are arbitrary unions of ideas (T 1.1.5.1, also see Chapter 2), 
there is no natural transition from one idea to another. Reason only compares the 
ideas given to it, and does not produce new ideas (T 1.3.14.5). Also, reason ‘can 
never be a motive to any action of the will’, neither can it ‘oppose[s] passion in the 
direction of the will’ (T 2.3.3.1).  
Such characterisations of passions and reason might lead Hume’s readers to 
criticise him as being a subjectivist regarding morality, and as he is well known for 
grounding morality on sentiment: 
All morality depends upon our sentiments; and when any action, or quality 
of the mind, pleases us after a certain manner, we say it is virtuous; and 
when the neglect, or non-performance of it, displeases us after a like 
manner, we say that we lie under an obligation to perform it. (T 3.2.5.4) 
The non-representative character of sentiments implies that there is no truth or falsity 
in matters of sentiments: 
Now ’tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of 
any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, 
compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, 
volitions, and actions. ’Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounc’d 
either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason. (T 
3.1.1.9) 
So for any persons having different moral sentiments concerning the same object, 
one might think that they are equally right, as there is simply no standard besides the 
sentiments, and reason has no role to play in morality.  
However, this relativist view is not Hume’s position. Although reason cannot 
alter the original principles of human nature, it can still guide our moral sentiments 
by discovering the true relations of ideas and matters of fact, and thus eliminate those 
‘unreasonable’ moral sentiments which are caused by the false relations of ideas and 
matters of fact: 
’[T]is only in two senses, that any affection can be call’d unreasonable. 
First, When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, 
is founded on the supposition of the existence of objects, which really do 
not exist. Secondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we choose 
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 means insufficient for the design’d end, and deceive ourselves in our 
judgment of causes and effects. Where a passion is neither founded on 
false suppositions, nor chooses means insufficient for the end, the 
understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. (T 2.3.3.16) 
In short, Hume’s view that human nature is immutable implies that in matters of 
sentiments, the same input should always produce the same output. Therefore, in 
order to change the output, the input must be changed. Hume famously claims that: 
Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never 
pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. (T 2.3.3.4) 
Reason serves the passions by discovering the truth, and obeys them because of its 
inert nature. 
A related distinction between matters of fact and matters of sentiment could be 
illuminated by a brief discussion on the ‘is-ought’ distinction. An is-statement is a 
descriptive statement which tells us the relations of ideas or the matters of fact; an 
ought-statement bears a normative force which motivates or forbids us to do certain 
action. Based on his distinction between reason and sentiments, Hume claims that no 
ought-statement could be deduced only from is-statements. 
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always 
remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of 
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations 
concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that 
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with 
no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This 
change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as 
this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis 
necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time 
that a reason shou’d be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, 
how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely 
different from it. (T 3.1.1.27) 
This distinction might at first sight seem to be quite clear, but further reflection 
might show that it is indeed not so easy to determine the status of a statement 
containing the word ‘ought’ or its cognates. As Hume thinks that an obligation is just 
an action the neglect or non-performance of which displeases us after a certain 
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 manner, it seems an ought-statement can be converted into an is-statement about our 
sentiment. Therefore, one might object that we can reason from at least some 
is-statements to ought-statements. In reply, we can point out that a statement 
containing an ‘ought’ or some other evaluative term is not necessarily an 
ought-statement. Hume’s distinction between these two kinds of statements does not 
concern the term used, but concerns the way a statement is made (or what speech-act 
theorists call its ‘force’).5 An is-statement is made by reason alone; while an 
ought-statement is made on the basis of a certain sentiment felt by the person who 
makes it. Therefore, when I say ‘everyone ought not to lie’, this might be an 
is-statement if it is just a factual report to the effect that lying displeases people, 
regardless of my own sentiment towards it; or it might be an ought-statement, if I 
make it on the basis of my felt displeasure caused by the presence of lying. Only in 
the latter case would I be truly under an obligation and be expressing the expectation 
that this is the same for the other people. The fact that most people share a certain 
sentiment towards lying can just be neutral for me if I am not displeased by it. 
  
5 Or, as Dabney Townsend puts it, this distinction is made between ‘ways of thinking, understood as 
operations of the mind, not between two classes of propositions’ (Townsend 2001, p. 4). 
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 Part II 
Hume’s Aesthetics 
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 Chapter 6 
Beauty 
 
Compared with his deep and scrupulous treatment of knowledge and morality, 
Hume’s discussion of beauty is brief and fragmentary. In the Treatise and the two 
Enquiries, beauty is merely discussed in order to illuminate his views on morality. In 
Hume’s Essays, although we can find some pieces focusing on art and criticism, no 
systematic presentation of his view of beauty is available. Worse still, in Hume’s 
scattered notes on beauty, he mentions without clear definitions several kinds of 
beauty, such as natural beauty, moral beauty, beauty of form, beauty of interest, etc. 
This causes difficulties for any attempt to clarify and articulate his views, especially 
for those commentators focusing on his aesthetics. This chapter will try to sort out 
some central aspects of Hume’s idea of beauty. Given the difficulties just mentioned, 
this attempt will inevitably be brief and somewhat inconclusive; but it should 
nonetheless be able to help us understand his ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. 
The sense of beauty and deformity, according to Hume, is a calm passion (T 
2.1.1.3). By itself this claim leaves undecided the nature of beauty: it can be some 
quality in the object, in which case the sense of it is similar to the perception of 
geometrical properties; or it can be purely a subjective feeling. Let’s call the first 
case the quality-view, and the second case the sentiment-view. In the Treatise we can 
find a passage which strongly suggests the quality-view: 
[B]eauty is such an order and construction of parts, as either by the 
primary constitution of our nature, by custom, or by caprice, is fitted to 
give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul. (T 2.1.8.2) 
Also, in the second Enquiry, we find: 
Some species of beauty, especially the natural kinds, on their first 
appearance, command our affection and approbation; and where they fail 
of this effect, it is impossible for any reasoning to redress their influence, 
or adapt them better to our taste and sentiment. (EPM 1.9) 
That some species of beauty might fail to ‘command our affection and approbation’ 
suggests that beauty is not equal to the sentiment it arouses.  
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 However, in both Enquiries and his essays, we can find passages which both 
affirm the sentiment-view and deny the quality-view: 
Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived. 
(EHU 12.33) 
EUCLID has fully explained all the qualities of the circle; but has not, in 
any proposition, said a word of its beauty. The reason is evident. The 
beauty is not a quality of the circle. It lies not in any part of the line, whose 
parts are equally distant from a common centre. It is only the effect, which 
that figure produces upon the mind, whose peculiar fabric or structure 
renders it susceptible of such sentiments. (EPM APP 1.14; an almost 
identical passage can be found in E-Sc, p. 219) 
The mathematician, who took no other pleasure in reading VIRGIL, but 
that of examining ENEAS’s voyage by the map, might perfectly 
understand the meaning of every Latin word, employed by that divine 
author; and consequently, might have a distinct idea of the whole narration. 
He would even have a more distinct idea of it, than they could attain who 
had not studied so exactly the geography of the poem. He knew, therefore, 
every thing in the poem: But he was ignorant of its beauty; because the 
beauty, properly speaking, lies not in the poem, but in the sentiment or 
taste of the reader. And where a man has no such delicacy of temper, as to 
make him feel this sentiment, he must be ignorant of the beauty, though 
possessed of the science and understanding of an angel. (E-Sc, p. 219) 
Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind 
which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty. 
(E-ST, p. 268) 
No clear statement of the same position can be found in the Treatise, hence Hume 
might have changed his mind after the publication of it; or at least, as the second 
Enquiry includes apparently contrary passages, the word ‘beauty’ might have 
different meanings for Hume. As suggested by Peter Jones (1976, p. 49), perhaps the 
quality which causes the sentiment of beauty is ‘by courtesy’ called ‘beauty’, and 
hence the sentiment-view is the more fundamental one. In any case, as no passage 
which affirms the quality-view but denies the sentiment-view can be found, while the 
opposite view is presented in the passages quoted above, the sentiment-view should 
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 more likely be the central view of Hume. The next task is to determine more 
precisely the details of this position. 
In the Treatise, Hume thinks that ‘the power of producing pain and pleasure 
makes in this manner the essence of beauty and deformity’ (T 2.1.8.2). Although he 
does not connect pleasure and pain to beauty and deformity explicitly in his later 
works, the same, or at least similar, connection is implicit there. However, as Hume 
appears to have switched from the quality-view to the sentiment-view, a different 
formulation should be provided. For if natural beauty is held to be a sentiment 
produced by a figure upon the mind (EPM APP 1.14), it seems we can at least assert 
for the moment that beauty is a sentiment accompanied by a certain pleasure, or itself 
a pleasure of a certain kind; while deformity is a sentiment accompanied by a certain 
pain, or itself a pain of a certain kind. Unfortunately, Hume’s texts do not provide 
any decisive evidence for us to choose between these two different formulations; but 
if we bear in mind his experimental method, perhaps Hume is deliberately vague 
here, because no matter which formulation is the correct one, all we have in our 
experience is a sensation of pleasure or pain. This is obviously the case if beauty is 
itself a pleasure, and deformity a pain. If, on the other hand, beauty and deformity 
are some sentiments other than the accompanying pleasure and pain, then they do not 
provide separable sensations. As a result, the two formulations are effectively the 
same. Perhaps it is sufficient and more faithful to Hume to say merely that by 
pleasure we feel beauty, and by pain we feel deformity. 
Although the sentiment-view of beauty should be more fundamental than the 
quality-view, it does not mean that Hume does not use the word ‘beauty’ to refer to a 
certain quality. The courtesy-use of the word ‘beauty’ is applied to qualities ‘which 
are naturally fitted to excite agreeable sentiments’ (E-ST, p. 271). In this sense, 
beauty is a quality’s tendency to produce the sentiment of beauty, and in the absence 
of any counteracting qualities, an object possessing such a quality is beautiful. This 
quality is not always realised, as there are other factors relevant to its realisation. 
These factors include subjective conditions, such as ‘[a] perfect serenity of mind, a 
recollection of thought, a due attention to the object’ (ibid.). More on these factors 
will be said in our next chapter on the judgement of beauty. 
Hume distinguishes beauty into natural beauty and moral beauty, but he does 
not clearly spell out this distinction. We know that ‘[i]t is on the proportion, relation, 
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 and position of parts, that all natural beauty depends’ (EPM APP 1.13), but we 
cannot find any similar claim concerning moral beauty. Probably moral beauty 
depends on a person’s moral character, but then another question arises: what is the 
difference, if any, between moral beauty and virtue? I shall leave this question 
unanswered, as I could see no hint of any clear answer in Hume. 
There is another question concerning the distinction between natural beauty and 
moral beauty which is more interesting. Does this distinction have anything to do 
with art criticism? In ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, Hume asserts without detailed 
argument that differences in moral principles make us unable to relish a work which 
does not properly blame a vicious manner, and hence this must be allowed to be a 
blemish of that work (E-ST, p. 282-283).6 No similar remark for natural beauty is 
available. Apart from this obscure consideration, the distinction between natural 
beauty and moral beauty seems to be irrelevant to art criticism.  
Beauty can also be distinguished into beauty of form and beauty of interest. 
Hume mentions these two kinds of beauty only in one place: 
The observation of convenience gives pleasure, since convenience is a 
beauty. But after what manner does it give pleasure? ’Tis certain our own 
interest is not in the least concern’d; and as this is a beauty of interest, not 
of form, so to speak, it must delight us merely by communication, and by 
our sympathizing with the proprietor of the lodging. (T 2.2.5.16, my 
italics) 
Similarly, Hume does not clearly tell us the difference between these two kinds of 
beauty. However, as the context of this quote is a discussion on how and why we see 
the utility of something as beauty, we can anticipate that beauty of interest is a 
beauty which depends on something’s utility, while beauty of form has no such 
dependence. Given the contention that natural beauty depends on ‘the proportion, 
relation, and position of parts’, one might be tempted to think that natural beauty and 
beauty of form are equal; but this appears not to be the case, for Hume holds that 
there are some morally beautiful mental qualities, such as cheerfulness, which are 
immediately agreeable ‘without any utility or any tendency to farther good’ (EPM 
7.2). Thus, the beauty of such qualities is not the beauty of interest, though it sounds 
odd to call it a beauty of form; and it should be classified as moral beauty, rather than 
6 This claim is discussed in depth in Chapter 13. 
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 natural beauty. Conversely, there are some qualities, such as physical strength, or the 
agility of animals, which are a beauty of interest, but should be classified as natural 
beauty, rather than moral beauty. 
Sympathy plays an important role in our perception of beauty, especially the 
beauty of interest. Without sympathy, only those characters or qualities which 
actually benefit me would have a beauty of interest for me. However, as a matter of 
fact, we can see the beauty of another person’s house, as well as that of an 
imprisoned athlete. Sometimes we might even see the beauty of some characters or 
qualities which are contrary to our own interest, such as the courage of our enemy. 
We can feel the beauty of such characters or qualities by sympathising with other 
people, real or imaginary, and thus our idea of such beauty is enlivened and becomes 
an impression.7 
Sympathy is also involved in our perception of the beauty of form. Since our 
perception of beauty does not merely consist in the perception of a figure, but also 
involves the mind’s reaction to an impression of it, the subjective conditions also 
partly determine the beauty perceived. Different people might perceive different 
beauties, because of their different sensibility, different cultural background, 
different personal experience, etc. For example, ‘in countries, where men’s bodies 
are apt to exceed in corpulency, personal beauty is placed in a much greater degree 
of slenderness, than in countries, where that is the most usual defect’ (EPM 8.9). 
Such subjective factors constitute a person’s unique ‘viewpoint’. If a person 
sympathises with another person and thus enters into her viewpoint, an object might 
change from being beautiful to being deformed, or from being deformed to being 
beautiful. In the case of beauty of interest, we choose the viewpoint of those who are 
directly affected by the utility of the character or quality. However, for beauty of 
form, it is not clear whether any particular viewpoint should be privileged, and if so, 
which viewpoint that is. This problem brings us to the issue of the judgement of 
beauty, to which we now turn. 
  
7 Note that nothing said here concerns the normative question of which viewpoint should be adopted, 
but just shows that we have an ability to go beyond our personal viewpoint. This normative question 
is addressed in Chapter 7 and 12. 
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 Chapter 7 
Judgements of Beauty 
 
Hume’s view that beauty is a sentiment makes it perplexing why judgements of 
beauty are needed. As he puts in ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, ‘a thousand different 
sentiments, excited by the same object, are all right: Because no sentiment represents 
what is really in the object’ (E-ST, p. 268). If there is no right or wrong in matters of 
beauty, why should there be any judgement of beauty? As a matter of fact, neither 
the maxim de gustibus non disputandum est, nor the common agreement on the 
comparative judgement of the merit of Milton and Ogilby appears to be 
representative of what ordinarily happens. On the one hand, even in ages like the 
contemporary world, where people are more tolerant of different factual and 
evaluative opinions, people both make judgements of beauty, and dispute very often 
on matters of beauty. On the other hand, only a small proportion of comparative 
judgements are made concerning objects so disproportioned as in the case of Milton 
and Ogilby. Although Hume does not explicitly say so, this is probably also the 
situation he observes. As an adherent of the experimental method, and an anatomist 
of human nature, Hume’s task is to anatomise this phenomenon, and tell us what 
exactly is done by a judgement of beauty. 
We should start with the reason why people make judgements of beauty, rather 
than rest contented with remarks limited to their own subjective sentiments. Two 
possible reasons can be gathered from Hume’s works, and both of them rely on his 
supposition of a common human nature. Firstly, as stressed by Peter Jones, Hume’s 
view on beauty is embedded in ‘contexts where man is considered as a social being’ 
(1976, p. 324). One of the most important aspects of this nature as a social being is 
that people want to agree with others, especially their close acquaintances (ibid., p. 
338). The variety of taste could not satisfy this desire, while at the same time, a 
certain degree of regularity is observable. The beauty of an object would not be 
different for a person every time she looks at it. People of similar taste are seldom 
totally absent in a person’s circle of acquaintances. It appears that agreement is still 
possible. Therefore, different sentiments of beauty aroused by the same object in 
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 different people are compared in a certain way. Judgements of beauty are made, and 
some of the sentiments are confirmed, while others condemned.  
The second possible reason is related to Hume’s view of language in general. 
He writes: 
The more we converse with mankind, and the greater social intercourse we 
maintain, the more shall we be familiarized to these general preferences 
and distinctions, without which our conversation and discourse could 
scarcely be rendered intelligible to each other. Every man’s interest is 
peculiar to himself, and the aversions and desires, which result from it, 
cannot be supposed to affect others in a like degree. General language, 
therefore, being formed for general use, must be moulded on some more 
general views, and must affix the epithets of praise or blame, in conformity 
to sentiments, which arise from the general interests of the community. 
(EPM 5.42) 
General language is used for the communication of something accessible to the 
general public. A person, in using general language, is required to adopt a general 
and stable viewpoint which could be shared by other people. It seems that the word 
‘beauty’ in its ‘courtesy use’ should be an instance of general language. ‘Beauty’ in 
this sense refers to a certain quality in objects. As the only sensible effect such a 
quality produces is a sentiment, every discourse concerning such a quality is an 
‘intercourse of sentiments ... in society and conversation,’ which ‘makes us form 
some general unalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of’ the 
quality in question (ibid.). If we do not adopt a stable viewpoint, then our 
‘fluctuating situations produce a continual variation on objects, and throw them into 
such different and contrary lights and positions’ (EPM 5.41). Also, if we do not 
adopt the same general viewpoint, our different situations cause us to have different 
sentiments, and thus we lack a common ground for communication ‘without which 
our conversation and discourse could scarcely be rendered intelligible to each other’.  
Understood in this way, the word ‘beauty’ in its ‘courtesy use’ requires us to 
adopt the same general and stable viewpoint, and the quality of beauty in this sense 
should be one which gives us a sentiment of beauty under certain circumstances, 
including the adoption of the same general and stable viewpoint. As we are distanced 
from our own personal viewpoint in perceiving such a quality of beauty, the 
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 sentiment of beauty is inevitably weaker in its intensity, and hence, for Hume, the 
sense of beauty is a calm passion (T 2.1.1.3). Also, recall that Hume claims in the 
Treatise that ‘beauty’ refers to the ‘order and construction of parts’ which pleases 
‘either by the primary constitution of our nature, by custom, or by caprice’ (T 
2.1.8.2). Now we can see that we have arrived at a narrower sense of ‘beauty’, as the 
generality and stability required by the nature of general language precludes those 
which please merely by caprice. Thus, it is still correct to say that all sentiments of 
beauty are equally right, in the sense that such sentiments do not represent anything 
and thus there is no question of truth and falsity for them. However, on the other 
hand, we can also say that not all sentiments of beauty are equally right, as the 
viewpoints from which the view of an object could produce these sentiments are not 
all qualified as general viewpoints; and even among different possible general 
viewpoints, we might still make some further discrimination, so that one and only 
one of them is admitted as the correct general viewpoint, and its corresponding 
sentiment of beauty as the right sentiment. The purely subjectivist view is thus 
unable to answer the internal requirement of the word ‘beauty’. People make 
judgements of beauty at least because they may fail to adopt the correct viewpoint, 
and, as a result, make a mistake concerning whether an object really possesses a 
quality of beauty. 
In both reasons above, we can see that the aim of judging beauty is to reduce 
variety, and to achieve stability and regularity in matters of beauty. However, it is 
not obvious how such stability and regularity are achievable. As Hume clearly writes, 
‘Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived’ (EHU 
12.33). A comparison between the judgement of beauty and the judgement of 
geometrical qualities can help us to see the problem. 
In the case of a geometrical quality such as triangularity, when we have a 
veridical perception of it, this quality causes an impression in our mind, and this 
impression refers to it.8 Depending on the agreement or disagreement between our 
impression and the objective quality, our impression of such quality is either true or 
8 It is in fact difficult to capture Hume’s thought on such objective judgements accurately, as to speak 
of an objective quality in Hume’s philosophy is quite tricky. Strictly speaking, Hume cannot say 
anything about quality as a mind-independent feature of the external world, as all we can experience 
are just perceptions in mind. This makes terms like ‘real matters of fact’ perplexing. As this problem 
cannot be addressed within the scope of our discussion, we can only bypass it, and understand the 
referential relation pointed to here as something similar to what we normally call representation.  
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 false, as ‘they have a reference to something beyond themselves, to wit, real matter 
of fact; and are not always conformable to that standard’ (E-ST, p. 268). The 
objective quality serves as a standard of judgement. A judgement of such an 
objective quality specifies the quality we should look for in order to verify it. If the 
quality specified can be found in the object, the judgement is true, while contrary 
opinions are falsified. As a result, different opinions of such objective qualities are 
regulated and stabilised.  
In contrast, our sentiment of beauty is just a pleasurable feeling caused by a 
certain quality in an object, and this pleasure does not represent its cause. Therefore, 
we might not be able to identify the true cause of our sentiment of beauty. It is 
possible that a person, having correctly adopted a general viewpoint in surveying an 
object, and in the absence of other possible errors, feels the sentiment of beauty that 
object naturally produces in virtue of one of its qualities, but nonetheless has no idea 
of what the true cause of her sentiment is. She could only say that the object is 
beautiful, or, at most, that there is a certain je ne sais quoi which makes it beautiful. 
In such a case, even when that person in some sense correctly judges an object 
beautiful, her judgement does not tell us how to verify it, and thus when there are 
conflicting but equally confused judgements made by different people, we are unable 
to decide whose judgement is correct, and different sentiments are not regulated and 
stabilised. 
Therefore, in order to achieve the stability and regularity that people tend to 
seek in matters of beauty, we need more than the ability to enjoy the right sentiment 
of beauty. With the assumption of a common human nature that includes certain 
original principles of sentiments, the same quality arouses the same sentiment of 
beauty in the beholders who share the same internal state under the same external 
situation. The internal state includes the delicacy of mental taste, the (metaphorical) 
viewpoint adopted, the level of intelligence, etc. The relevant aspects of the external 
situation include those—depending on the categories of the artworks, among which 
Hume’s main concern is literature—which would affect our apprehension of 
artworks.9 A book full of typographical errors is bad in the case of literature, 
9 James Grant (2013) points out that, with reference to Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary, a critic is just ‘a 
judge only of literature’ in Hume’s days (p. 50, n. 25). Despite this linguistic fact, we will follow the 
common practice in the literature on ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ to use a broader sense of the word 
‘critic’ in referring to art critics in general. 
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 similarly for poor lighting in the case of painting, and a noisy concert hall in the case 
of music. Therefore, in order to achieve agreement on matters of beauty, we have to 
settle the disputes concerning all these factors. If a person has the ability to specify 
the conditions under which her judgement of beauty is made, as well as the quality 
which causes her sentiment of beauty, her judgement might then be able to be 
verified by other people. Criticism is precisely that kind of activity which involves 
this additional ability.  
Notice here that the account given just now only describes what is needed for 
the same sentiment to be shared. That a judgement of beauty is generally shared by 
different people shows only that it is a candidate for the true judgement. So there is a 
question concerning what makes a judgement of beauty true, but not merely 
generally shared. How could we move a step further? Consider the analogy between 
beauty and vision given by Hume: 
If, in the sound state of the organ, there be an entire or a considerable 
uniformity of sentiment among men, we may thence derive an idea of the 
perfect beauty; in like manner as the appearance of objects in day-light, to 
the eye of a man in health, is denominated their true and real colour, even 
while colour is allowed to be merely a phantasm of the senses. (E-ST, p. 
272) 
Although Hume uses the term ‘perfect beauty’ here, the term ‘true and real colour’ 
suggests that ‘true and real beauty’ might be acceptable for him. If colour can be true 
and real in the sense provided in this passage, then why not allow the same for 
beauty? Therefore, we will not avoid using the term ‘true beauty’ in the following, 
provided that it is understood in the sense suggested in this quote: true beauty is the 
quality which produces a uniformity of sentiment of beauty among men with sound 
state of the organ. Accordingly, then, an object is truly beautiful when it possesses 
true beauty. Hume’s exclusion of the external situation here is objectionable, but for 
our interpretative purpose, we might just follow him in focusing on the internal state.  
What exactly the sound internal state is will be a topic in our discussion on ‘Of 
the Standard of Taste’ in Part III. For the moment, it suffices to say that a judgement 
of beauty is true when the object judged to be beautiful is truly beautiful in the sense 
just given. This implies that our ability to determine the truth of a judgement of 
beauty depends on our ability to determine the soundness of the internal state. In 
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 order to evaluate a judgement of beauty, we have to make other judgements 
concerning the soundness of the internal state. As taste is a part of this internal state, 
we might want to distinguish two senses of ‘judgements of taste’. In one sense, it 
means judgements made by taste. For Hume, such judgements include moral 
judgements and judgements of beauty. In another sense, ‘judgements of taste’ are 
those which judge the soundness of taste. For clarity’s sake, hereafter, ‘judgements 
of taste’ will only be used to refer to those judgements concerning the soundness of 
taste, in order to sharply distinguish them from judgements of beauty, which concern 
the quality of beauty. 
The difficulty of achieving stability and regularity in matters of beauty should 
not be underestimated. Nothing said above has indicated how the true cause of a 
sentiment of beauty and the correct general viewpoint can be identified. Hume’s 
solution to this problem can be constructed from his discussion of taste and its 
standard, which forms the backbone of his essay on criticism—’Of the Standard of 
Taste’. Our discussion of his solution should be postponed to Part III. Before that, a 
brief account of how a judgement of beauty is made should be provided. 
As in the case of moral judgements, sympathy also plays an essential role in a 
judgement of beauty. As noted above, a specific general viewpoint should be adopted 
in a judgement of beauty. In ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, this viewpoint is held to be 
that of the intended audience of an artwork (E-ST, p. 276).10 Therefore, a critic has 
to imagine herself as a member of the intended audience. This is achieved by 
sympathy. In Chapter 4, four steps have been distinguished. The first step is the 
formation of an idea of the pleasure or pain of the intended audience. In some cases, 
there are no direct observations of their reaction to the artwork in question. The 
formation of the idea of the pleasure or pain of the intended audience is made 
possible by the critic’s knowledge of the relevant facts, such as the details of the age 
and culture. Such knowledge allows the critic to achieve a general understanding of 
the object in the same way as the intended audience, and to form the same idea of 
that object. The critic’s imagination will then naturally move from this idea to an 
idea of pleasure or pain in accord with the general rules in her own mind. Besides, 
there can be cases in which the critic has a chance to directly observe the intended 
audience’s reaction to the artwork. Given the resemblance between every human 
10 More detail will be provided in Chapter 12. 
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 being, the critic infers from the expression of the intended audience to an idea of 
their pleasure or pain. The direct observation of the intended audience’s reaction 
strengthens the idea of their pleasure formed on the basis of general rules.  
Once the idea of their pleasure or pain is formed, the process of sympathy goes 
on. The idea of pleasure or pain is enlivened by the force and vivacity of the critic’s 
lively impression of her own self, through the three principles of association between 
the corresponding idea of herself and her idea of the intended audience. As a result, 
the idea of the pleasure or pain of the intended audience becomes that very pleasure 
or pain. Based on the sentiment thus felt, a judgement of beauty is made. Ideally the 
critic’s pleasure or pain would be as strong as that of the intended audience, but as 
we have already seen near the end of Chapter 4, how much force or vivacity is 
communicated depends on how close the critic’s idea of herself and her idea of the 
intended audience are associated by the three natural relations. Therefore, unless the 
critic is herself a member of the intended audience, the pleasure or pain felt would 
seldom be as strong as that of the intended audience. However, when the critic learns 
how to use general terms such as ‘beauty’ in a language, she also learns at the same 
time the effects such natural relations would have on the sentiment acquired through 
sympathy. Therefore, although her sentiment might not be perfectly correct, at least 
the language used in giving her judgement can be corrected to offset the variable 
effect of the natural relations. 
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 Part III 
‘Of the Standard of Taste’ 
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 Chapter 8 
A Summary of ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ 
 
Hume starts his essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ with a discussion of the variety of 
taste. This variety can be found within one’s circle of acquaintances, and it is more 
obvious among people in different countries and ages. However, beneath this 
appearance, the variety is indeed still greater. Some apparent agreement is in fact 
merely verbal, because in every language there are general evaluative terms which 
are used in order to express praise or blame by all competent users of that language; 
but if we attend to the particular applications of such terms, we can find that they are 
applied in very different ways by different people.11 
Hume goes on to tell us that ‘[t]hose who found morality on sentiment, more 
than on reason, are inclined to comprehend ethics under the former observation’ 
(E-ST, p. 266). After an illustration of a similar case in morality, he comments that 
‘[t]he merit of delivering true general precepts in ethics is indeed very small’ (E-ST, 
p. 268). This follows from the observation that verbal agreement can conceal the 
underlying disagreement concerning the application of such evaluative terms. What 
is really important is the application of such terms, which implies our praise or blame 
of the character or action in question, but not agreement merely on the evaluative 
import of such terms as linguistic items. Therefore, Hume continues: 
That people, who invented the word charity, and used it in a good sense, 
inculcated more clearly and much more efficaciously, the precept, be 
charitable, than any pretended legislator or prophet, who should insert 
such a maxim in his writings. (ibid.) 
11 As Hume moves on, we can see that his presentation of the variety of taste here somehow distorts 
the actual situation. The fact is rather that despite such a variety, it can also be observed that there is 
no radical change in people’s taste: 
The same HOMER, who pleased at ATHENS and ROME two thousand years ago, is still 
admired at PARIS and at LONDON. (E-ST, p. 271) 
In contrast, Hume observes that in the case of speculative opinions: 
These are in continual flux and revolution. The son embraces a different system from the 
father. Nay, there scarcely is any man, who can boast of great constancy and uniformity in 
this particular. (E-ST, p. 283) 
It seems Hume is deliberately selective here, as a rhetorical strategy, in order to build up the tension 
which is to be relieved by his demonstration later in the essay of how the variety of taste is 
constrained and stabilised. 
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 To use the word ‘charity’ in a good sense is to apply it in accordance with our 
‘just sentiment of morals’ (E-ST, p. 267). By using it justly in society, my praise of a 
charitable action would lead others to appreciate the virtue of that action; and my 
repeated just applications of the word ‘charity’ provide a basis on which the others 
could have their sentiments be connected, by certain general rules, to the kind of 
actions which are charitable. The effect of such a concrete model can narrow down 
the variety of moral sentiments within our society, and this effect cannot be achieved 
through merely ‘delivering true general precepts’. This reflection on the case of 
morality shows that, despite the obvious variety in moral sentiments, there is 
nonetheless a certain way in which we can narrow down this variety, and achieve a 
certain degree of agreement. Hume’s reader would then wonder: is there any similar 
way to reduce the variety of taste? 
In the presence of the variety of taste, ‘[i]t is natural for us to seek a Standard of 
Taste’ (E-ST, p. 268). By reference to such a standard, different sentiments could be 
reconciled, or at least be confirmed or condemned.12 This seems to follow from his 
view that human beings have a natural propensity to form and follow general rules, 
or in other words, a propensity (a) to find out the regularities underlying our 
experience, and (b) to regulate our life in a principled way. This propensity motivates 
us to seek a standard of taste, that is, to find out the regularity in our aesthetic life, so 
that we can regulate our related activities accordingly. 
However, that we have this natural tendency does not imply the existence of 
such a standard, nor does it imply our ability to find it even if it exists. This sceptical 
position is supported by a species of philosophy, which appeals to the non-referential 
nature of sentiments. The thought here is that since sentiments do not refer to 
anything beyond themselves, and are always real when felt, in one sense they are ‘all 
right’. This line of thought also applies to the case of beauty, as beauty is a kind of 
sentiment. Therefore, when taste is evaluated in terms of the sentiments aroused, the 
fact that sentiments are ‘all right’ means that there is no standard of taste. This view 
is labelled as ‘the principle of the natural equality of taste’, and concurs with the 
common sense maxim that de gustibus non disputandum est. 
12 There are some other ways to read this passage. See Section D of Chapter 14 for an evaluation of 
the main proposals. 
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 If there is only one species of common sense, the sceptical position above might 
be admitted as a truthful analysis of human nature, but this is not Hume’s position on 
the matter. At least in the realm of art criticism, we can find cases like those in which 
Ogilby and Milton, or Bunyan and Addison are compared. The principle of the 
natural equality of taste is found to be forgotten in such cases, where general 
agreements concerning the comparative merit of one author over that of another one 
are observed, and opposite sentiments are rejected as ‘absurd and ridiculous’ (E-ST, 
p. 269). This shows that at least in some cases of art criticism, it is commonsensical 
that ‘the taste of all individuals is not on an equal footing’ (E-ST, p.279), and can be 
evaluated.  
The discussion of these two species of common sense completes the 
stage-setting of the essay. Hume would surely not think that all commonsensical 
views are rationally justifiable, but the fact that they are generally held indicates that 
there is probably some feature of our common human nature which is responsible for 
the pre-philosophical acceptance of such views, and hence this fact should be 
explained in Hume’s science of human nature. Whilst a short philosophical analysis 
of the first species of common sense has been provided, the second one is at this 
stage only provided as a piece of unanalysed observation: only a fool doubts that 
Milton is greater than Ogilby. We are left with the questions: why do we have the 
second species of common sense? Which human phenomena are relevant? What is 
the nature of these relevant human phenomena? And most importantly, does it show 
that there is a certain mechanism which reduces the variety of taste? The remaining 
parts of the essay are dedicated to these questions, and their answer hinges on the 
idea of a standard of taste.13 
13 Being set up in this way, we can see that, contrary to the view of many commentators, Hume need 
not show that universal agreement is achievable, nor does he need to show that we can always decide 
whose judgement of beauty is better. Indeed, the second species of common sense is a very weak 
negative claim. It just shows that in some cases, the principle of the nature equality of taste does not 
hold, and that certain evaluative judgements of taste can be made. This is far weaker than the claim 
that there can in fact be universal agreement in such cases—not even in the examples used, as there is 
a disagreement between those being ridiculed and those who ridicule them. Misunderstanding of this 
sort might explain why people might be surprised by the weak claim Hume makes later that: 
It is sufficient for our present purpose, if we have proved, that the taste of all individuals 
is not upon an equal footing, and that some men in general, however difficult to be 
particularly pitched upon, will be acknowledged by universal sentiment to have a 
preference above others. (E-ST, p. 279) 
This sounds too weak to those people who attribute a far more ambitious project to Hume. 
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 The rest of the essay can be separated into three parts. The first part explicates 
the second species of common sense by showing in what sense the tastes of different 
people are not on an equal footing. This explication culminates at the identification 
of the soundness of the state of organ as the factor which explains why the taste of 
different people is unequal. The second part is a development of the finding in the 
previous part. It discusses five causes of defective taste, from which an idea of true 
judge is provided, and their joint verdict is identified as the true standard of taste and 
beauty. This shows that ‘some men in general ... will be acknowledged by universal 
sentiment to have a preference above others’ (ibid.). Therefore, Hume has shown that 
there is a mechanism by which the variety of taste is reduced. The third part focuses 
on two sources of blameless variations of sentiment. This discussion delineates how 
far the second species of common sense holds. 
With this overview of the whole essay in hand, we can move on to see what 
Hume tells us after he has set the stage for the ensuring discussion. Since the 
examples by which he introduces the second species of common sense are drawn 
from art criticism, a reflection on this kind of human activity might reveal more 
about such a commonsensical view. One of the salient features of art criticism is that 
it involves rules of art, and that is why Hume starts his reflection by considering the 
role of rules of art in art criticism.  
According to Hume, rules of art are generalisations of experience ‘concerning 
what has been universally found to please in all countries and in all ages’ (E-ST, p. 
269). He finds that artworks such as poetry ‘must be confined by rules of art, 
discovered to the author either by genius or observation’ (E-ST, p. 270). Art criticism 
is rule-governed, for it is one of critic’s jobs to identify the quality which pleases 
according to true rules of art. However, it is also observed that our sentiment seems 
not to always agree with general rules. The observation of such discrepancies might 
then serve as an objection to criticism in general, because it suggests that art 
criticism is thus an activity which appeals to rules which are partly based on 
sentiments, while the production of sentiments is not really governed by rules. Hume 
rejects this objection by claiming that this disagreement between the sentiment 
actually felt and the sentiment predicted according to a particular rule of art can only 
be an objection to that rule. ‘If [some qualities] are found to please, they cannot be 
faults; let the pleasure, which they produce, be ever so unexpected and 
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 unaccountable’ (ibid.). The rule should be revised according to the new evidence 
given by the sentiments. Treating the problem in this way, the status of sentiment as 
the ultimate evidence of an object’s power to please is emphasised. 
Here it seems that Hume is still trapped in the same predicament, as the sceptic 
could happily agree with all these claims about art criticism. The assertion of the 
authority of sentiments as evidence might even seem to support the natural equality 
of taste, as it suggests that sentiments are not to be corrected by rules of art. However, 
this is just an appearance. The next step in Hume’s essay reveals a blind spot of the 
sceptical view. Hume does not disagree with the sceptical view regarding the 
non-referential nature of sentiment and hence the lack of a standard in this sense; but 
instead of focusing on the product of taste, he draws our attention to an aspect 
omitted by the sceptics—the capricious operation of the mind, including but not 
restricted to mental taste. Although he does not write explicitly in the same way, 
Hume’s treatment of the mind in relation to taste is in the same spirit as his treatment 
of the imagination in his discussion of causal belief. There, reflective general rules 
concerning the operation of the imagination help us to decide when the imagination 
operates in accordance to its natural regularity. Similarly, concerning the operation 
of mental taste, general rules could be formed for the decision of when its operation 
conforms to its natural principles. ‘A perfect serenity of mind, a recollection of 
thought, a due attention to the object’ are requisite for the regular operation of the 
mind, and only when it operates in this way would ‘the beauties, which are naturally 
fitted to excite agreeable sentiments, immediately display their energy’ (E-ST, p. 
271).  
It is now clear that what is at stake is the regularity of the operations of the mind. 
This regularity might be obscured by ‘all the caprices of mode and fashion, all the 
mistakes of ignorance and envy’ (ibid.). In order to establish general rules which 
correctly capture this regularity, it is a good idea to consider the durable admiration 
received by canonical artworks which pass the test of time, for it is more likely that 
people are pleased by such masterpieces in accordance with the natural principles of 
taste, instead of by some transient factors. 
In brief, we should distinguish between a sound state and a defective state of the 
mind, and only when it is in the sound state could the sentiment actually felt be relied 
on as evidence, from which we judge the beauty of an artwork and derive general 
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 rules of art. When we are not merely talking about the quality of our private 
sentiment, but try to judge the beauty of artworks, our own mental taste has to be 
judged first. The second species of common sense which rejects ‘the principle of the 
natural equality of taste’ is thus analysed to be a view concerning the soundness of 
the operation of taste. It is supported by our ability to judge our taste in terms of it 
operation.14 
With the distinction between sound and defective states in place, Hume moves 
on in the next part of his essay to substantiate this distinction by discussing five traits 
which constitute a sound state. These five traits will be discussed later in Chapter 10. 
Hume summarises his discussion of them in this way: 
Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected 
by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this 
valuable character [of true judge]; and the joint verdict of such, wherever 
they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty. (E-ST, p. 
278-279) 
The last step in Hume’s explication of his idea of a true judge is a response to 
the worry that the true judge might not be found, and hence that it is impossible for 
us to find the standard of taste. Hume replies that whether a critic is a true judge is a 
matter of fact, and is to be decided by arguments. Moreover, he thinks that it is 
sufficient for the present purpose, that is, to provide a philosophical analysis of the 
14 Nick Zangwill wonders why there is a disparity in terms of normative force between judgements of 
beauty and ugliness and judgements of niceness and nastiness of food (Zangwill 2001, p. 155). He 
says, ‘[a]s far as judgments of niceness and nastiness are concerned, anything goes’ (ibid.). Just like 
beauty and ugliness, in the cases of niceness and nastiness we normally would not expect that no one 
would agree with us. However, when there is somebody who disagrees and gives a different 
judgement, we might at first be a little bit surprised and ask that person to taste the food again; but if 
her judgement does not change, we would not insist on getting her to agree with us. 
Zangwill asks that if, according to Hume, the soundness of mental taste explains why the former 
kind of judgements is normative, why not also say the same thing in the case of bodily taste? It seems 
Hume is committed to the implausible view that the latter kind of judgements should be as normative 
as the former one. 
Zangwill’s worry arises because he does not consider the courtesy use of ‘beauty’. ‘Beauty’ in 
this sense is a term in general language, and this leads to the demand of the adoption of a general 
viewpoint. However, ‘niceness’ and ‘nastiness’ do not seem to be the same kind of terms, and are 
more similar to terms like ‘pleasing’, which are used to report purely subjective sensations. Probably 
it is this last requirement which explains the difference between the normative force in the case of 
mental taste and that of bodily taste. 
There is a further complication here, which has seldom been noticed. In the famous wine tasting 
case drawn from Don Quixote (E-ST, p. 272), although it is also a case of bodily taste, there seems to 
be a much higher degree of normativity carried by the judgements of the two kinsmen. Why is there 
such a big difference in the normative force within cases of bodily taste? The answer to this question 
is tied to Hume’s idea of general rules of art, and so we will return to this question in the next chapter 
(n. 15). 
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 second species of common sense, to have shown (1) ‘that the taste of all individuals 
is not upon an equal footing’, and (2) ‘that some men in general ... will be 
acknowledged by universal sentiment to have a preference above others’ (E-ST, p. 
279). The first one is shown by the distinction between sound and defective states; 
the second one is shown by the idea of a true judge. Also, he adds that the difficulty 
of finding the standard of taste ‘is not so great as it is represented’ (ibid.). This is 
suggested by the historical observation that matters of taste are less liable to change. 
Hume explains as follow: 
Many men, when left to themselves, have but a faint and dubious 
perception of beauty, who yet are capable of relishing any fine stroke, 
which is pointed out to them. Every convert to the admiration of the real 
poet or orator is the cause of some new conversion. (E-ST, p. 280) 
Such conversion narrows down the difference between people’s taste, and results in 
the stability observed in matters of taste. 
In the last part of the essay, Hume turns to discuss the two blameless sources of 
variations of sentiment, so as to prevent his readers from being too optimistic to 
think that all variety of taste could be eliminated. The variations discussed here are 
blameless because: 
[They] are not sufficient indeed to confound all the boundaries of beauty 
and deformity, but will often serve to produce a difference in the degrees 
of our approbation and blame. (ibid.) 
These variations are those which concern the degree of approbation and blame, but 
not those in cases where the same artwork is praised and blamed by different people. 
One source is the internal frame of mind, or ‘the different humours of particular 
men’; the other one is the external situation, including ‘the particular manners and 
opinions of our age and country’ (ibid.). Although such variations are inevitable, and 
no standard can allow us to correct them, an educated person could make allowance 
for such variations when she judges the beauty of an artwork, and in so doing, a true 
judgement of beauty can still be made. A detailed explanation will be provided in 
Chapter 12. 
There is a complication concerning the second source—the external situation. If 
there is a difference between the moral principle held by the author and that of ours, 
as in a poem where a character which is evil according to our moral standard does 
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 not receive proper punishment, this is not an instance of blameless variation. Hume 
writes: 
I cannot, nor is it proper I should, enter into such sentiments; and however 
I may excuse the poet, on account of the manners of his age, I never can 
relish the composition. (E-ST, p. 282) 
This view is not sufficiently explained. An explanation will be proposed in Chapter 
13. This complication affects Hume’s treatment of another factor of external 
situation, that is, religious principles. Normally, since reason ‘is not hearkened to in 
religious matters’ (E-ST, p. 283), speculative errors in religious principles are the 
most excusable. However, if an artist is bigoted or superstitious, so that her religious 
principles imposes a set of moral principles different from ours on her artwork, this 
will then be treated in the same way as in cases involving different moral principles, 
and not to be counted as blameless. 
This discussion on the two sources of blameless variations reminds us that even 
when we talk about the quality of beauty of artworks, rather than merely our own 
private sentiment of beauty, there are still some inevitable variations in our sentiment. 
As a result, when we judge the beauty of an artwork, if we are aware of the presence 
of such variations, then we should not expect or demand a total agreement on the 
sentiments we felt. In such cases, as long as we have made appropriate allowance for 
the blameless variations, a verbal agreement on the pronounced judgement of beauty 
is all we can achieve. 
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 Chapter 9 
Art Criticism 
 
Art criticism is more than merely judging the beauty of artworks. It also involves the 
identification of the quality which causes the sentiment of beauty, the determination 
of the correct general viewpoint to be adopted, and the ranking of artworks within 
their genre. In virtue of these activities, art critics aim to discover and bring other 
people to appreciate the true beauty of different artworks, or in Hume’s terminology, 
to feel the sentiment of beauty naturally caused by different artworks. This follows 
from the nature of judgements of beauty. As a judgement of beauty concerns whether 
an object really possesses a generally accessible quality, and the only sensible effect 
of such a quality is a private feeling of pleasure, a critic can only justify her 
judgements by bringing other people to see the beauty of that object themselves. This 
means that art criticism is essentially a social practice, as the success of a critic 
depends on whether other people can share her sentiment of beauty.  
Critics need to communicate their sentiment with other people, including other 
critics and ordinary people, through discussion of the beauty of artworks. As people 
often disagree on the beauty of an artwork, such discussions should not be conceived 
as any single person’s attempt to impose her own sentiment on other people. Instead, 
everyone involved in the discussion tries to convince the others to share their own 
sentiment through something similar to rational arguments.  
The precise nature of such ‘arguments’ will be explained soon. What we should 
now pay attention to is the reciprocity of the discussion involved in art criticism. 
Each critic should be sensitive to the reactions of other people. If a critic failed to 
convince another person, instead of insisting on her sentiment, she should reflect on 
her own judgement, to see if it is rather her sentiment that is faulty. No fair criticism 
of ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ should make use of examples which treat art critics as 
people who are totally confident of their sentiment, and unwilling to step back and 
reflect on their own judgement.  
Sometimes criticisms of the essay assume that the decision whether a critic’s 
judgement should be accepted depends on the establishment of her status as a true 
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 judge, or at least a better judge. However, for various reasons, it might be argued that 
such a status could not be rationally established, so that the critic’s judgement could 
not be rationally accepted. As a result, everyone can just refuse to try to share the 
others’ sentiment. They can insist on their own one, just because of the infirmity of 
the other’s status as a critic. Confronted by such criticism, Hume would probably 
reply that the same reason which shows the infirmity of the other’s status also holds 
for one’s own self. This universal infirmity should rather cause critics to be more 
humble and more willing to experience different sentiments. When a critic shares 
another critic’s sentiment, a valid ground of comparison between different 
sentiments could then be found, because the comparison is no longer between 
sentiments of different critics whose status is not established, but between different 
sentiments within one and the same person. With this illustration, it should be clear 
now why the reciprocity of the discussion between art critics should be stressed. 
As the aim of art criticism is to discover and bring other people to feel true 
beauty, it is not enough to convince the others that something is beautiful for a 
certain group of critics to which they might not belong. A person might utter a 
statement ‘this artwork is beautiful’ without having that very sentiment which can 
ground this utterance. This can be illustrated by the distinction between is-statement 
and ought-statement discussed at the end of Chapter 5. The statement ‘this artwork is 
beautiful’ might be analogous to an ought-statement, in the sense that it is made on 
the basis of the sentiment of beauty actually felt. On the other hand, it might be just 
an is-statement which concerns the general taste: 
Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of 
taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more 
properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavour to 
fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general taste of mankind, 
or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry. 
(EHU 12.33, my italics) 
It is certainly not the aim of art criticism to lead a person to merely make a claim 
about ‘the general taste of mankind’. Therefore, in order to bring other people to 
appreciate the beauty of an artwork, art critics have to guide them in a certain way in 
appreciating the artwork, so that they could have a genuine sentiment of beauty 
aroused by it. They determine the viewpoint to be adopted on the basis of their 
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 art-historical and cultural knowledge. Hume requires that the general viewpoint to be 
adopted should be the viewpoint of the intended audience (E-ST, p. 276). He does 
not argue for this requirement. It is reasonable to question why that viewpoint should 
be privileged, as it is not the only general viewpoint available. More on this topic 
will be said in Chapter 12. 
Besides, critics need to bring other people to attend to the quality which 
produces the sentiment of beauty in a certain manner. Sometimes, a person might 
perceive an artwork from the required viewpoint, but still not feel the sentiment of 
beauty it would naturally produce, because she could not duly attend to the quality 
which is responsible for the artwork’s beauty. The critic’s solution of this problem 
can be constructed from Hume’s discussion of how to silence a bad critic (E-ST, p. 
273-274). A critic first draws some general rule of art from masterpieces in which 
that quality is ‘presented singly and in high degree’ and produces the sentiment of 
beauty. Then she asks the opponent whom she wants to convince to see that quality’s 
influence on these masterpieces. As that quality is presented singly and in high 
degree there, it is much easier for that person to notice its influence. Once the 
opponent agrees on such a general rule, her imagination has been sharpened by those 
masterpieces to be more sensitive to the influence of that quality. Then, the critic 
tries to demonstrate that the very same principle has the same influence on the 
artwork in question. Since the critic’s interlocutor is now more sensitive to that 
quality, she might then be able to notice the influence of it, and come to feel the 
sentiment of beauty. Thus, the critic has succeeded in convincing her audience, in the 
sense that this person can now judge the beauty of that artwork on her own, 
according to the new sentiment she feels in virtue of her improved sensitivity. The 
comparison is strictly speaking made between two different judgements made by the 
same person, rather than between the original judgement of the opponent and that 
made by the critic. It should be noted that the discussion as presented here does not 
depend on the prior establishment of the critic as the one having a superior taste; on 
the contrary, it is only after the person has been convinced that the superiority of the 
taste of the critic would be established. The endorsement of a critic as having 
superior taste is implied in the acceptance of her superior judgement of beauty. 
However, the critic might fail to convince her opponent. Perhaps she has 
misidentified the cause of her sentiment of beauty, and hence although she has 
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 produced a general rule of art correctly on the basis of those masterpieces, the rule is 
simply irrelevant to the artworks in question, as her sentiment of beauty is actually 
caused by some other quality. Therefore, even if the opponent can see the influence 
of that general rule on those masterpieces, and her imagination is then more sensitive 
to that quality, she is not thus in any sense aided by the critic to see the beauty of that 
artwork. In such a case, the critic has a reason to reflect on her sentiment, and 
perhaps she would then discover some faults on her side, which prevents the proper 
identification of the true cause of her sentiment. This brings us back to the question 
raised near the end of Chapter 7, concerning how the true cause of a person’s 
sentiment of beauty is identified. 
The solution to this problem involves two components. First, we need an 
account of how a critic can determine which qualities of the artwork are possible 
causes of her sentiment; second, we should also show that the critic has the ability to 
identify the true cause among these possible causes. We start with the first 
component. 
As mentioned before, a sentiment of beauty does not represent its cause. 
Therefore, in order to know what its possible cause is, we need something external to 
this sentiment. Since the identification of the cause of a sentiment of beauty is in fact 
a causal judgement, we can easily construct an account for such an identification by 
considering what Hume’s view of causal judgement is.  
Basically, a causal judgement is a judgement made according to the general rule 
formed on experience. When we observe a constant conjunction of two things—a 
certain quality and a sentiment of beauty, our imagination naturally forms a general 
rule connecting them, so that the appearance of one naturally introduces the idea of 
another. If the first one is always (or in general) followed by the second one, the first 
one is then considered as the cause of the second one. 
Accordingly, a quality is considered as a cause of a sentiment of beauty if it ‘has 
been universally found to please in all countries and in all ages’ (E-ST, p. 269). The 
general rule formed in this case is a rule of art, which connects empirically our 
private sentiment of beauty to a publicly accessible quality in artworks. With such a 
rule of art, a critic can add more substance to her judgement of beauty by pointing to 
a particular quality in an artwork as responsible for its beauty, so that she is thus able 
to do more than merely say that the artwork is beautiful. However, artworks are not 
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 all beautiful in the same way. There are many qualities which have been found to 
cause us to have a sentiment of beauty. Therefore, a qualified critic should have a 
stock of rules of art, each of which suggests a different quality as a possible cause of 
a sentiment beauty. Perhaps in some case, the artwork in consideration possesses 
only one quality which resembles exactly a possible cause of a sentiment of beauty. 
In the absence of other possibilities, a critic can then conclude that this quality is the 
true cause of her sentiment. However, such a simple case probably never obtains, or 
is at least very infrequent. Most often an artwork possesses a number of qualities, 
each of which resembles imperfectly a possible cause of a sentiment of beauty. The 
imperfect resemblances imply that the rules of art available might not apply to these 
qualities. Perhaps only some of them really please, and each of them pleases to a 
different degree. Confronted with this messy situation, a critic needs something in 
addition to her stock of rules of art to correctly identify the true cause(s) of her 
sentiment. What might that be? 
One might suggest that the critic can use her reason to make the decision, but 
this cannot be the case. A sentiment of beauty is produced by a highly particular 
combination of various factors. The same quality does not please in all situations: 
A very small variation of the object, even where the same qualities are 
preserved, will destroy a sentiment. Thus, the same beauty, transferred to a 
different sex, excites no amorous passion, where nature is not extremely 
perverted. (EPM 5, n. 17) 
However, reasonings from experience involve the use of general rules. Even in cases 
where such rules are formulated explicitly so that we can employ them in our 
reasoning, their application always allows a certain degree of flexibility, so that they 
are applied also to cases which resemble imperfectly the original experience on 
which we form such rules. In other words, our reasoning is too general to help us in 
making judgements sensitive enough to the particularities that matter in the 
production of the sentiment of beauty. Therefore, our reason cannot help us 
determine which quality is the true cause of our sentiment of beauty. 
This reply immediately invites an objection. When Hume talks about the use of 
general rules of art in determining the delicacy of a person’s mental taste, he says:  
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 And if the same qualities, in a continued composition and in a smaller 
degree, affect not the organs with a sensible delight or uneasiness, we 
exclude the person from all pretensions to this delicacy. (E-ST, p. 273) 
This passage suggests that the same qualities should always have the same effects, 
which seems to contradict the above reply. A possible way to reconcile the two 
quoted passages above is to determine what Hume means by ‘the same qualities’. 
Perhaps Hume has conflated two different kinds of terms in his talk of 
qualities—purely descriptive terms and partly evaluative terms. The latter are used to 
refer to qualities our perceptions of which are ‘coloured’ by the sentiments of beauty 
or deformity they elicit in us. These qualities might also be captured by a complete 
physical description of the object, just like Euclid’s full description of a circle which 
misses nothing but its beauty (EPM APP 1.14). Yet when a different object is 
considered, the same partly evaluative term would pick out some other qualities 
which might not be referred to by the same descriptive terms. How exactly these two 
kinds of terms are related is a serious issue, but we do not need to get involved into 
this trouble. We can proceed by simply noticing that probably in the passage quoted 
from the second Enquiry above, Hume has in mind the qualities referred to by purely 
descriptive terms, while in the passage from ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, he is 
thinking of those our perception of which are coloured by our sentiment of beauty. 
Qualities of the first kind, such as a certain narrative structure, can produce different 
sentiments of beauty or deformity when they are found in different objects. 
Therefore, in some cases, a small variation in the purely descriptive qualities an 
object, except its narrative structure, would destroy its beauty. In contrast, qualities 
of the second kind, such as a liveliness of style, cease to be referred to by the same 
partly evaluative term if their non-evaluative elements have had produced a different 
sentiment of beauty. Therefore, insofar as the term ‘liveliness of style’ is used, even 
when the quality referred to is found ‘in a continued composition and in a smaller 
degree’, a person with delicate taste should still have the same but weaker sentiment 
of beauty aroused. 
It is of course possible that Hume is inconsistent between different works, but 
we do not seem to have any conclusive evidence for or against this charge. However, 
this speculation does illuminate something important in our interpretation of his ‘Of 
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 the Standard of Taste’ regarding his view of the role of general rules of art, and 
relatedly, how art criticism works. 
Hume starts his reflection on art criticism with a paragraph on general rules of 
art which should be read carefully. A little bit historical background can help us 
appreciate that succinct discussion. During Hume’s days, there were two main views 
on criticism. The ‘rule-based neo-classical critical theory’ held that the value of an 
artwork depends on its conformity to a set of rules; while another view, based on 
Longinus’ On the Sublime, held that the merit of some great ancient artworks 
consists rather in their breaking the rules (Friday 1998, p. 548-549). Hume’s thought 
differs from both of these views. On the one hand, he disagrees with the latter view 
in denying that artworks can please ‘by their transgressions of rule or order’; on the 
other hand, he disagrees with the neo-classicists in that he allows that rules of art can 
be rejected on the basis of sentiment (E-ST, p. 270). However, provided with only 
these two negative claims, the readers of the essay are still in the dark about Hume’s 
thought on the role of rules of art. 
Commentators of Hume usually assume without argument that Hume thinks that 
critics judge the value of artworks by checking their conformity to rules of art, but 
this does not seem to be the truth. Hume’s position seems to be rather that, instead of 
using rules of art to infer from causes to effects, art critics use rules of art to help 
them identify the causes of their sentiments of beauty. There are two arguments 
which can be offered against the common reading. First, Hume explicitly holds that 
sentiment is the more authoritative source of evidence than rules of art at the end of 
his paragraph on rules of art (ibid.). A natural consequence of this position is to say 
that critics should ensure that their taste is sound enough to be trustworthy, rather 
than to put aside the established authority of sentiment and to ask the critics to reason 
according to rules of art. 
Second, if Hume really thinks that a critic can reason from the presence of a 
quality to a judgement of beauty, the critic should be able to identify the quality 
before she makes her judgement. This brings in the question concerning which kind 
of terms, purely descriptive or partly evaluative, are used in referring to that quality. 
If a partly evaluative term is used, the quality referred to can only be discerned if a 
person has already been able to see its beauty, and thus the rule of art is redundant. 
But the case is no better if a purely descriptive term is used. As shown in the first 
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 paragraph of this chapter, a critic can justify her judgement of beauty only if she can 
bring the others to share her sentiment. If it is allowed that a critic can reason from 
the presence of a purely descriptive quality to a judgement of beauty, then either it is 
possible to justify a judgement of beauty without anyone having a corresponding 
sentiment, which directly contradicts what we found previously, or we should 
conclude that this kind of reasoning does not justify judgements of beauty, so that 
there seems to be no point to reason in this way. None of the above options sounds 
attractive, so we would like to know if there is any better option which fits with 
Hume’s thought.  
Earlier in this chapter we have already discussed a better option, that is, the 
thesis that a rule of art helps a critic identify the true cause of her sentiment of beauty. 
We will not repeat the details of that discussion here. In order to complete the present 
digression on the role of rules of art, we just need to supplement that discussion with 
a demonstration that this suggestion fits well with Hume’s text. 
In ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, Hume illustrates explicitly only twice how rules 
of art are of use, both of which have been mentioned earlier in this chapter. We start 
with the second of the two. Hume shows us how to silence a bad critic. As we have 
seen above, the rule is used to draw the bad critic’s attention to the right quality in 
some masterpieces. This is indeed just a special application of the identification of 
the quality which causes a sentiment of beauty.  
When we go back a little bit in the same paragraph, we find the first place 
where Hume shows the use of rules of art. There he uses such rules to test the 
delicacy of taste. The rules are drawn from ‘established models’, where the relevant 
quality is ‘presented singly and in a high degree’, so that we do not need to isolate it 
from a mixture of various qualities. The absence of other possible causes of the 
sentiment of beauty allows us to easily draw a rule of art from such artworks. Thus 
having identified a quality as a cause of a sentiment of beauty, Hume continues, we 
can test the delicacy of a person’s taste with a composition in which the same quality 
is found in a mixture and in a smaller degree. In this case, it is obvious that no 
reasoning is involved. Hume goes on to claim that: 
To produce these general rules or avowed patterns of composition is like 
finding the key with the leathern thong; which justified the verdict of 
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 SANCHO’s kinsmen, and confounded those pretended judges who had 
condemned them. (E-ST, p. 273) 
Both the rules and the key help people identify the true cause. One of the kinsmen 
notices the taste of iron, but strictly speaking, the cause of that taste is identified only 
when the key is found (similarly for the taste of leather detected by the other 
kinsman). Readers of Hume’s essay tend to connect the taste of iron too close with 
the key, without mentioning the quality of being contaminated by iron object 
in-between. This, I suggest, might explain why Hume’s analogy between the rules 
and the key is misleading. If we take this intermediary component into consideration, 
then we can understand better how the analogy holds.  
Actually, besides being contaminated by some iron object (the key), there can 
be other possible causes of the taste of iron—for example, the hogshead might be 
contaminated by blood (objective), or the kinsman has a small bleeding wound in his 
mouth (subjective). These alternative possibilities are not rejected before the 
discovery of the key. Therefore, the finding of the key helps the kinsmen and the 
townsmen identify the true cause of the taste of iron in the hogshead. Their 
judgements are justified because the presence of the key with the leathern thong 
shows that there is really an objective quality—namely, being contaminated by 
objects made of iron and leather—that is possessed by the wine.15  
15 In a footnote in last chapter (n. 14), we found a difference in the degree of normativity between 
judgements of niceness and nastiness and judgements made by the two kinsmen. Here we can see the 
reason. If ‘niceness’ and ‘nastiness’, as in Zangwill’s usage, are in fact not terms in general language, 
then when someone says that some food is nice or nasty, she is just expressing what she feels, but not 
asserting that the food has a specific generally accessible quality called ‘niceness’ or ‘nastiness’. Of 
course there is a certain quality—or, we might say, a certain je ne sais quoi—in the food that is 
responsible for the pleasant or unpleasant taste, but such a quality is not thus identified by the 
judgement of niceness or nastiness. 
In contrast, when one of the kinsmen says that there is a taste of iron in the wine, he is in a 
certain sense pointing to the existence of some specific substance in the wine. ‘A taste of iron’ does 
not just refer to a particular sensation, but also ties that sensation to what is found to cause it in 
general. In other words, ‘a taste of iron’ can be viewed as shorthand of ‘a taste generally caused by 
objects contaminated by iron’ (this is a partly evaluative term as the word ‘contaminated’ is used). 
Operating in the background is a general rule connecting a certain quality to a particular kind of 
sensation. The quality ‘being contaminated by iron’ is an objective matter, and hence not every 
opinion is right. Therefore, the judgement of the kinsman carries a normative force that is absent in 
judgements of niceness and nastiness. 
Similarly, linguistic constructions like ‘the beauty of expression’, ‘the beauty of structure’, etc. 
should be understood in the same way as ‘a taste of iron’. They are also terms the existence of which 
presupposes a corresponding general rule—in this case, a rule of art—connecting a certain quality to a 
sentiment of beauty. The role played by such a general rule is also of identifying the cause of the 
sentiment. This observation, if sound, provides further support to the interpretation developed here. 
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 Analogously, when a person is pleased by an artwork, there are different 
possible causes of her sentiment. Beside the presence of a quality of beauty, perhaps 
she might be under the influence of some defective external situation (objective), or 
she has been set in a joyous mood by some irrelevant factors (subjective). However, 
in this case, not only is she unable to ascertain the true cause of her sentiment before 
the ‘general rules or avowed patterns of composition’ are produced, but she might 
even be unable to include the true cause in the list of possible causes, as she might 
not have experienced that quality before, and hence could not come up with it as a 
possibility. The rules allow the critic to come up with a list of qualities, among other 
factors, such as internal and external defects, as the possible causes. In cases where 
there is only one possibility, the critic can conclude that the quality identified by the 
rule is the true cause, and her judgement can be justified, as she can use the same 
rule to convince other critics.16 As for cases where more than one possibility can be 
found, the critic would need to make a decision as to which one is the true cause. 
This remark closes this digression on the role of rules of art, and carries us forward 
to the second piece of an explanation of how a critic can identify the true cause of 
her sentiment of beauty. 
In the Treatise, we find in a footnote the following passage: 
No questions in philosophy are more difficult, than when a number of 
causes present themselves for the same phænomenon, to determine which 
is the principal and predominant. There seldom is any very precise 
argument to fix our choice, and men must be contented to be guided by a 
kind of taste or fancy, arising from analogy, and a comparison of similar 
instances. (T 3.2.3, n.1) 
This passage suggests that it is one of the functions of our mental taste to identify the 
true cause of a person’s sentiment of beauty. The idea seems to be that the sound 
16 It is not clear whether there is any disanalogy here. In the wine tasting case, it seems the finding of 
the key immediately justifies the kinsmen’s judgements; but in the case of criticism, the critic is 
merely equipped with a rule which helps her convince the others and justifies her judgement. This 
seems to be a significant difference, but perhaps it is not. We can easily imagine some people who 
have no idea of what consequence the key would have to the hogshead, so that even after the key is 
found, the kinsmen would still need to show further the influence of the presence of a key in a 
hogshead to these people. Conversely, we might also imagine that for the quality identified by the rule, 
were it to be pointed out, the other people would immediately be able to relish it, so that simply 
producing the rule would constitute equally obvious evidence as finding the key. These two 
possibilities show that the difference between the case of wine tasting and that of criticism is just a 
difference in the degree of familiarity, and is not philosophically significant. Then, it sounds more 
reasonable to say that there is no disanalogy here. 
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 operation of the mental taste enables a person to identify the true cause. As a result, 
the need of making judgements of taste is introduced once again. It should now be 
obvious how important it is to discuss taste and the standard of taste in a 
philosophical reflection on art criticism. Taste does not merely produce the sentiment 
of beauty which could ground our judgement of beauty, it also singles out the true 
cause of this sentiment, so that art critics could justify their judgement of beauty by 
bringing other people to attend to the relevant quality and feel the same sentiment of 
beauty. However, as mental taste does not always operate properly, art critics have to 
reflectively judge the operation of their taste in order to ensure that their taste does 
not mislead them to form wrong judgement or to single out the wrong cause of their 
sentiment. Therefore, a standard of taste is required, so that they can judge their 
taste.17 Before we move on to the discussion of the nature of the standard of taste, 
we should first examine what Hume means exactly by ‘true judge’. 
  
17 Just like the case of ‘judgement of taste’ and ‘judgement of beauty’, most if not all commentators 
of Hume’s ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ also do not distinguish ‘standard of taste’ from ‘standard of 
beauty’. However, this distinction should better be drawn along a similar line as in the case of 
‘judgement of taste’ and ‘judgement of beauty’: ‘standard of taste’ refers to a standard concerning the 
soundness of the operation of the mental taste, and ‘standard of beauty’ refers to a standard 
concerning whether something truly possesses a quality of beauty. 
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 Chapter 10 
True Judges and Their Five Traits 
 
It should be obvious that true judges play an important role in Hume’s account of the 
standard of taste, as their joint verdict is ‘the true standard of taste and beauty’ (E-ST, 
p. 278-279). True judges are those critics who have delicacy of taste, by which they 
are ‘sensible of every beauty and every blemish, in any composition or discourse’ 
(E-ST, p. 274). Also, they have to be practiced, so that the power of their taste could 
be fully executed. Moreover, in order to rank an artwork properly among those in the 
same genre, true judges have to form comparisons. Besides, they should be free from 
prejudice, and adopt the viewpoint of the intended audience. Lastly, they should 
possess good sense, which enables them to check the influence of prejudice, to grasp 
the relation between different parts of an artwork, to determine how well an artwork 
has met its end, and to understand the reasonings involved in an artwork.  
These five traits of true judges are sometimes held to be the marks by which 
true judges are known. If this is true, then the question whether something is 
beautiful could be solved by finding the true judges, and then asking for their joint 
verdict on it. It would then follow that a person could have a correct belief that 
something is beautiful without having to have any direct experience of it. The joint 
verdict of true judges, as the true standard of taste and beauty, is the best testimony 
of an object’s beauty; and if a person is justified to believe that some critics are true 
judges, then she is also justified to believe in their joint verdict. This proposal might 
sound attractive, and hence the question where true judges are to be found appears to 
be crucial to art criticism.  
However, this interpretation is probably wrong for two reasons. Firstly, it does 
not fit well with the text. After his summary of the character of the true judges, and 
the identification of their joint verdict as the true standard, Hume writes in the next 
paragraph: 
But where are such critics to be found? By what marks are they to be 
known? How distinguish them from pretenders? These questions are 
embarrassing; and seem to throw us back into the same uncertainty, from 
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 which, during the course of this essay, we have endeavoured to extricate 
ourselves. (E-ST, p. 279) 
If Hume really thinks that the five traits are the marks by which true judges are 
known, then these questions are too simple to be embarrassing. It seems Hume is not 
treating these traits as the marks of true judges.  
Secondly, a reflection on the five traits shows that, when they are considered as 
perfections, they cannot be known, and hence true judges could not be known by 
them. We should look at each of them in turn.  
Consider first the delicacy of taste. If a critic has a perfectly delicate taste, she is 
sensible of every beauty and every blemish. That means in order to determine 
whether a critic has this perfection, we have to be able to compare the beauties and 
blemishes to which she is sensible to all of those indeed possessed by an artwork. If 
the person’s responses track the work’s actual features, then this critic has a perfectly 
delicate taste. However, this means we should first be able to detect all of the 
beauties and blemishes of an object, before we can compare them with those sensed 
by the critic. As a consequence, unless we have first ascertained that some other 
critics have a perfectly delicate taste, we can never make the comparison and thus we 
are unable to determine whether the critic in question has the same perfection. 
However, in order to ascertain that the taste of these other critics is perfectly delicate, 
we need still some other critics who have perfectly delicate taste. An infinite regress 
is generated. An appeal to the ability in question could be justified only if it has 
already been justified in a prior instance.  
Worse still, even if we grant that we have perfectly delicate taste and that we are 
capable of ascertaining that this is so, it is still impossible to make the comparison. 
The sentiment caused by beauties and blemishes are just a certain kind of pleasure 
and displeasure. Such sentiments do not represent anything, thus we could not 
decisively infer from them to their causes. We have seen in Chapter 9 that the 
identification of the cause of a sentiment is an ability of sound taste. This ability of 
taste partly depends on its delicacy, since unless it is perfectly delicate, there might 
be some qualities that escaped its attention, and thus our taste might not be able to 
identify the true cause. Therefore we could only rely on our taste, which has been 
assumed for the sake of argument to be perfectly delicate, to identify the true cause 
of the sentiment. It seems we could not compare the beauty and blemish sensed by 
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 the critic with those actually possessed by the artwork and correctly identified by our 
perfectly delicate taste, because unless we beg the question and assume that the taste 
of that critic is perfectly delicate, we are not justified to think that she can identify 
the true cause of her sentiment, and hence her verbal report of what she sees is not 
trustworthy. 
A perfectly practiced critic should be a person whose taste can no longer be 
improved by practice. In order to determine whether a critic is perfectly practiced, 
we should be able to determine if her taste could be further improved by more 
practice. There seem to be only two possibilities. First, we might focus on the effect 
of further practice. Perhaps we know that no more practice advantageous to the 
critic’s taste is possible; but this kind of knowledge seems to be impossible. Since 
whether further practice is advantageous could only be ascertained retrospectively, 
and it seems always possible for a critic to engage in further practice, we can never 
reach the temporal point at which we could acquire such a kind of knowledge. Or 
second, we might focus on the current status of the taste of that critic. Perhaps we 
know beforehand how such the taste of a perfectly practiced critic would be, and 
then compare it with that of the critic in question. This leads to an infinite regress, as 
that perfectly practiced critic can be known only if we have already found another 
perfectly practiced critic, and so on. 
Similar reasons should hold for the perfection corresponding to the condition of 
forming comparisons. We can never know if a critic has made all possible or all 
necessary comparisons, either because it seems it is always possible to have new 
artworks in the same genre in the future, or we cannot determine whether a critic 
possesses this perfection unless we have already determined that another critic have 
it. 
Hume thinks that it is one of the roles of good sense to check the influence of 
prejudice, so the question whether a critic is perfectly free from prejudice depends on 
the question whether she has perfectly good sense. 
The case of good sense is similar to that of delicacy of taste, because both of 
them are abilities the superiority of which is judged by the performance, which is in 
turn judged by a comparison with an objective standard. The problem is that the 
standard is known only through that particular ability in question. Perfectly good 
sense is required to know for certain the objective standard, such as the general 
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 viewpoint of the intended audience, the relations between the parts of a work, the end 
of an artwork, and the reasonings involved. Unless we have perfectly good sense, 
and know that our sense is perfectly good, we could not be justified to think that we 
have infallible knowledge of the objective standard, and hence could not determine 
decisively whether other people have perfectly good sense. However, as the same 
reason holds for our own case, we could not be justified to believe that our sense is 
perfectly good even if it is. Therefore, both freedom-from-prejudice and good sense 
when considered as perfections could not be known. 
If these five traits as perfections could not be known, then either true judges 
could be known through other marks, or true judges could not be known at all. Hume 
does not provide any alternative marks of true judges, so he probably thinks that they 
could not be known. This has an apparently devastating consequence for the 
argument of Hume’s essay, as the upshot seems to be that no true standard of taste 
and beauty can be known. A complete response to this problem will be provided in 
the next chapter. The rest of this chapter will try to show that, although we cannot 
know the five traits as perfections, we can form comparative ideas of each trait. This 
finding will then help us in the next chapter to see what exactly a standard of taste 
and beauty is according to Hume. 
Although we cannot know whether a person’s taste is perfectly delicate, we can 
still compare the judgements of beauty made by different critics, and judge whose 
taste is better. In Chapter 9 we have seen how critics discuss such matters. A critic 
tries to bring her opponents to see the beauty of an artwork they did not see. She 
might fail, so that her opponents would after all still be unable to see that beauty. In 
some cases this would happen because that quality is indeed not beautiful; in some 
cases it is just because the discussion was not effective. There could be other reasons. 
When such an attempt fails, we could not decide whose taste is better. However, if a 
critic succeeds in bringing other critics to see the beauty they did not see, this is 
evidence that her taste is more delicate, in the sense that she is more sensitive to the 
beauties and blemishes of the artwork in question. Moreover, recall that in Chapter 7 
we have shown that the aim of judging beauty is to achieve stability and regularity in 
matters of beauty. Because of the more comprehensive objective ground now 
sensible, the scope of possible variation in the operation of taste would probably be 
narrower. Hence, the judgement of beauty afforded is probably more stable and 
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 regular and thus a better one. Experience of the constant conjunction of more delicate 
taste and better judgement of beauty leads us to form a general rule connecting them. 
Of course the real situation is probably more complex. For instance, perhaps 
there is some other beauty which is not noticed by that critic, but is clearly seen by 
her opponents. In such a case, we might not judge conclusively whose taste is more 
delicate. Nonetheless, we have a method for making such a decision. Also, we have 
pointed out in Chapter 8 that Hume does not aim at providing an account of how 
universal agreements are always achievable, so this complexity is not a problem for 
him. Notice that in this account, the delicacy of a critic’s taste is shown only after her 
opponents have made a better judgement of beauty under her guidance. This agrees 
with our observation in Chapter 9 that we do not need to know whose taste is better 
in order to be convinced by the better judgement.  
It might be worried that it is not so easy to bring other critics to see what they 
could not see. Yet Hume is quite optimistic on this point. He thinks that: 
Many men, when left to themselves, have but a faint and dubious 
perception of beauty, who yet are capable of relishing any fine stroke, 
which is pointed out to them. (E-ST, p. 280) 
It is much more difficult to see every beauty and blemish of an artwork wholly by 
one’s own endeavour than when guidance by other critics is consulted. This 
optimism might well be put into question. However, even if we can show that this 
optimism is unjustified, this can only show that art criticism is not something easy, 
which sounds more like a support for the account proposed above. 
It is not clear what it means to say that a critic is more practiced and has formed 
more comparisons than another critic. Sometimes we compare in the quantitative 
sense, so that we count the times each critic practiced and the number of 
comparisons formed. Sometimes a qualitative sense is adopted, so that we judge how 
well-practiced a critic is and whether she has made enough comparisons according to 
her performance in judging the beauty of an artwork. However, for any just 
inter-personal comparison of these two aspects, whether the quantitative or the 
qualitative sense is adopted, it has to take into consideration the talent of the critics 
being compared. Moreover, it does not seem to be the case that such inter-personal 
comparisons are the source of the idea that practice and forming comparison have a 
positive effect on our taste. It should be rather that when a person reflects on her own 
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 self to compare the judgements of beauty she makes before and after she has 
practiced and formed comparisons, she would then find that her taste can thus be 
improved. Perhaps as a result, she generalises this situation, and forms the idea that, 
in general, a better critic is more practiced and has formed more comparisons. 
Similarly, when a critic reflects on the viewpoint adopted, and revised her 
judgement by removing personal factors from her viewpoint, or adding more details 
about the situation of the intended audience to her viewpoint, she would find that her 
judgement of beauty becomes more general, so that more people could be convinced 
by her judgement. Thus she forms the idea that the more a person is free from 
prejudice, the better her judgement is.  
The case of good sense is probably similar to that of delicacy of taste. The 
previous observation that people can perceive better the beauty of an object when 
guided by other people should also hold in this case. When a critic is guided by 
another critic, so that the latter’s understanding of an artwork is presented to her, she 
might be able to understand that artwork in the same way, and to make a new 
judgement of beauty. She could then compare the two understandings and the two 
judgements of beauty, and find the defects in her previous understanding and 
judgement, which are now revealed and corrected. After several similar experiences, 
she would be able to observe that better understanding is generally joined with 
sounder judgement.  
That we can compare critics in terms of the five aspects above has great 
importance, because it means we can form general rules, implicit or explicit, with 
regard to the factors which affect the operation of taste. When it is observed 
repeatedly that sounder judgements of beauty are produced by critics who perform 
better along these five dimensions, reflective general rules on our taste are formed. 
With these rules, we know how to improve and correct our taste; and when we have 
evidence that our taste is operating under the influence of some defect in these five 
aspects, we know that we should not trust our own taste. Also, these general rules are 
similar to those general rules of art in the sense that they should be revised if they 
conflict with experience, as they are generalisations of experience. Moreover, it can 
now be seen how the idea of a better critic is related to the five traits on the basis of 
experience. Observations show that the five traits can improve judgements of beauty, 
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 and as a better critic is one who makes better judgements of beauty, observations 
also show that a better critic is a critic whose five traits are better. 
Lastly, it should be noted that the comparative ideas of the five traits are not the 
marks by which better judges are known. In the survey of these comparative ideas 
above, we can see that these advantages are known after we have ourselves made the 
judgements made by that critic who has these advantages, and as a result discovered 
that their judgements are better. As we have seen in Chapter 9, the superiority of a 
judgement of beauty is recognised by an internal comparison between it and another 
judgement made by the same critic. Only when we have first come to know whose 
judgement is better, and thus also who the better judge is, we would then be able to 
compare and evaluate the five traits of critics. Otherwise, we could at most say that 
their five traits are different, without any just evaluation possibly to be made. In 
other words, the mark of a better judge is her generally better judgements. 
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 Chapter 11 
Standards 
 
It is surprising that Hume’s general idea of what can be counted as a standard is not 
discussed in most writings on his ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. Although he does not 
discuss it in length, in the Treatise Hume talks about a kind of standard which is 
imaginary, just, but useless, and this discussion is indeed very important for our 
understanding of ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. It will be shown in the following that 
the true standard of taste as the joint verdict of true judges is precisely an instance of 
such an imaginary standard. 
The term ‘imaginary standard’ is first mentioned in Hume’s attempt to show 
that utmost precision and exactness should not be expected in geometry concerning 
the three proportions of objects—greater, less and equal. He asserts that ‘the only 
useful notion of equality, or inequality, is deriv’d from the whole united appearance 
and the comparison of particular objects’ (T 1.2.4.22). These proportions are often 
directly determined by the eye or the mind at once. Such decisions might be wrong, 
and we correct them in two ways: either by ‘a review or reflection’, or ‘by a 
justa-position of the objects; or where that is impracticable, by the use of some 
common and invariable measure’ (T 1.2.4.23). Such corrections are constrained by 
our instrument or art of measuring, so that we can never be totally free from errors. 
We know that there are bodies so minute that they could not be discerned, but 
nonetheless we can imagine that the addition or removal of any one of these minute 
bodies will render two equal figures unequal. As a result, Hume thinks that, on the 
basis of the observed improvement in the fineness of the corrections made, the 
natural propensity of the imagination to continue its motion causes us to imagine that 
even more and more refined corrections can be made, and thus we also imagine that 
the indiscernible inaccuracy in judgements of equality could be corrected. At last, we 
‘suppose some imaginary standard of equality, by which the appearances and 
measuring are exactly corrected, and the figures reduc’d entirely to that proportion’ 
(T 1.2.4.24). An example would be the standard of equality in length reduced to the 
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 equality in the numbers of indivisible points, which are too minute for computation 
and hence can only be useless (T 1.2.4.19). Hume continues: 
This standard is plainly imaginary. For as the very idea of equality is that 
of such a particular appearance corrected by justa-position or a common 
measure, the notion of any correction beyond what we have instruments 
and art to make, is a mere fiction of the mind, and useless as well as 
incomprehensible. (T 1.2.4.24) 
It is not difficult to see how the idea of the true standard of taste as the joint 
verdict of true judges is also imaginary or fictional in a similar way. As shown in last 
chapter, we cannot determine whether a critic is a true judge. This means that the 
true standard of taste is useless, because we cannot know what a joint verdict of true 
judges is without knowing who they are. This is not to deny the justness of this 
standard, as their taste is imagined to be the best possible one, and hence their joint 
verdict, if it exists, must be the best one.  
We have also seen in Chapter 9 that we can determine which judgement of 
beauty is better before the establishment of the comparative status as critic of those 
whose judgements are compared. Such decisions might be wrong, as when we try to 
make the same judgements as those made by the critics in question, we might fail to 
do so because of some external or internal defects, including the defects of our own 
taste. Perhaps we are not well-practiced, or have not made enough comparisons, or 
are not free from prejudice, etc. Such defects can be discerned in reflection, and be 
corrected accordingly. After that, we re-assess the judgements in comparison, and 
amend our evaluation of them. Two judgements which seemed to be equally good 
previously might then be discovered to be unequal. We can then observe that such 
corrections improve the accuracy and justness of our evaluation of judgements of 
beauty. However, we can only make such corrections in cases where we can discern 
the defects in our evaluation. Our ability to make such discernments constrains our 
ability to improve our evaluation both of judgements of beauty and soundness of 
taste.  
However, it can be observed that our ability to discern the defects could be 
improved, so that a more accurate evaluation of judgements of beauty can be made. 
Because of the natural propensity of the imagination to continue its motion, this 
observation causes us to fancy some imaginary critic, whose judgement only has 
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 some as yet indiscernible advantage over the one made by the best judge we can now 
distinguish. For the moment, due to our limited ability in evaluating judgements of 
beauty, the two judgements appear to be equally good. However, when our ability to 
discern the defects in our evaluation of judgements of beauty is improved, that 
advantage becomes discernible, so that we can judge that the imaginary critic is the 
better one.  
The imagination will then lead us to imagine that more and more refined 
corrections of our evaluation can be made, and finally, we imagine some true judges 
whose five traits are all perfect. Although we do not in fact have the ability to 
distinguish them, if they exist, from those who differ from them only indiscernibly, 
we still imagine that if we could make such a distinction and we will take their joint 
verdict as the true standard of taste and beauty. An imaginary standard is thus 
supposed. The joint verdict is the true standard of taste, because it is what the perfect 
taste would rule. It is also the true standard of beauty, because it is based on the 
sentiment of beauty naturally produced by an artwork when the operation of mental 
taste is perfectly sound.  
If anyone gives a verdict which does not conform to the true standard, this 
implies that her taste is not the best possible one, and the sentiment of beauty she 
feels is not the one which would be naturally produced by the artwork if her taste 
were the best possible. However, if a verdict conforms to the standard, it is still 
possible that the critic who makes this verdict is not a true judge, as the difference 
can be too minute to be reflected in language or general ideas. This should be 
expected, as it is part of the idea of an imaginary standard that there can be 
something which differs from it indiscernibly. 
Although this imaginary standard is useless, as our ability is not fine enough to 
make the relevant distinctions in order to apply it, this does not prevent Hume from 
providing a philosophical analysis of the second species of common sense and 
showing that the variety of taste is in fact under control. In Hume’s response to the 
possible challenge concerning the difficulty of finding any true judge, he tells us that: 
It is sufficient for our present purpose, if we have proved, that the taste of 
all individuals is not upon an equal footing, and that some men in general, 
however difficult to be particularly pitched upon, will be acknowledged by 
universal sentiment to have a preference above others. (E-ST, p. 279) 
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 We have now come to a position to understand why having proved these two points 
is sufficient. The first point, that ‘the taste of all individuals is not upon an equal 
footing’, is proved by the observation that the taste of different people deviate from 
the sound taste in various degrees and various ways. The second point, that some 
men in general are preferred by universal sentiment, is proved by the observed 
effects of some character traits, that is, the five traits of true judges, which contribute 
to the sound operation of taste, and their preferability, which is implicit in the word 
‘sound’, are held by Hume to be ‘acknowledged’ or ‘well known’.18  
Having proved these two points is sufficient for the purpose of providing a 
philosophical analysis of the second species of common sense because they show 
together that, concerning the soundness of the operation of taste, people have the 
ability to judge and correct their own taste. The fact that the tastes of different people 
are not equally sound does not entail that people know this inequality; but that some 
character traits are in fact preferred because of their contributions to sound taste 
implies that people have the ability to judge the soundness of taste, and that they 
prefer having a sound taste. As shown in last chapter, the judgement of the soundness 
of taste depends on the judgement of the stability and regularity of its product, that is, 
the judgement of beauty made by taste. Evaluations of judgements of beauty are 
made on the basis of internal comparisons between different judgements of beauty. 
Normally the case would be that in which an old judgement is compared to a new 
judgement, and the new one is made under the guidance of another critic. Such 
guidance can take different forms, such as pointing out the influence of a certain 
quality previously omitted, asking for more practice or more comparisons, detecting 
the unnoticed personal prejudice, providing a better understanding of an artwork, etc. 
In virtue of such guidance, a person’s taste is corrected and improved, so that a new 
and better judgement of beauty can be made and then be compared with the old one. 
Therefore, the ability of judging taste depends on the ability to correct one’s own 
taste. From the different kind of corrections arises a useless imaginary standard, as 
18 In fact, Hume does not provide any direct evidence for his view that the five traits are preferable. 
He tells us that ‘every one pretends to’ have the delicacy of taste (E-ST, p. 272); ‘a delicate taste of 
wit or beauty must always be a desirable quality’ (E-ST, p. 274); and ‘[i]t is well known ... [that] 
prejudice ... is no less contrary to good taste; nor has it less influence to corrupt our sentiment of 
beauty’ (E-ST, p. 277). The other three traits are then claimed to be advantageous to the delicacy of 
taste or the freedom-from-prejudice. Perhaps Hume is taking the preferability of these traits as an 
obvious fact. 
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 the imagination keeps on imagining further corrections, even beyond our ability to 
discriminate the difference.  
The examples used when Hume mentions the second species of common sense 
can be analysed in this way. When someone prefers Ogilby over Milton, or Bunyan 
over Addison, it can be found that this preference is a result of the defects in the 
operation of her taste. That there is a general agreement in rejecting her sentiment as 
absurd and ridiculous suggests that people have the ability to judge the taste of 
different people. This suggestion can be accepted, because the fact that the character 
of true judge is universally preferred presupposes that people have an idea of such a 
character, and this in turn presupposes their ability to judge the soundness of taste.  
That people can judge the soundness of taste and that they have a preference for 
the character of true judge shows that there is a natural mechanism in human nature 
which allows and causes people to converge on better judgements of beauty. 
Therefore the variety of taste is actually constrained by this mechanism, which also 
explains the lack of radical shifts in taste in history. 
If the true standard of taste is an imaginary standard which is also useless, then 
we are left with a question: is there any actual standard of taste? One might think that 
the general rules formed on the observations that judgements of beauty can be 
improved by the five traits might serve as standards of taste. However, this cannot be 
the case. Towards the end of last chapter we have seen why the comparative ideas of 
the five traits are not marks by which better judges are known. We can make 
inter-personal comparative judgement of these five traits only after we have already 
judged the taste of different critics. This judgement concerning their taste is made on 
the comparison of the judgements of beauty they make. In any particular discussion 
between critics, the one who makes the best judgement among them has the best 
taste, and her verdict would be counted as the standard. Of course her verdict is 
fallible, but this does not mean that it cannot serve as a standard. After Hume has 
illustrated his view on geometrical equality of objects, he applies the same analysis 
to the case of right lines. He writes, ‘The original standard of a right line is in reality 
nothing but a certain general appearance’ (T 1.2.4.30). Such a general appearance is 
fallible, but could be corrected and refined by measurement or juxtaposition, though 
it could never become certain. That an uncertain and fallible general appearance is 
referred to as a ‘standard’ by Hume shows that he does not think that a standard 
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 should be infallible. This suggests that we should distinguish a standard of taste from 
the true standard of taste, and that the latter is useless does not imply the former is 
also useless. While the true but useless standard of taste is the unknowable joint 
verdict of true judges, an actual but fallible standard of taste is the verdict of the 
critic who proves to have the best taste in a discussion.  
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 Chapter 12 
Viewpoint and Sympathy 
 
Among the five traits of true judges, one of them requires special attention. A true 
judge should be free from prejudice. This requirement might be referred to as the 
freedom-from-prejudice requirement. When a true judge judges the beauty of an 
artwork, she should forget herself, and adopt the general viewpoint of the intended 
audience, or simply the intended viewpoint. Hume thinks that, in order to produce 
the desired effects, an orator must have her intended audience in mind, as their 
particular features determine how they would respond (E-ST, p. 276). Without due 
argument, Hume simply extends the case of oration to other art forms. Perhaps he 
thinks that in the case of other art forms, the artist, in creating an artwork, also has an 
intention to produce a certain response in a particular audience. As a result, the 
artist’s idea of her intended audience shapes her artwork, and the proper 
understanding of it would have to acknowledge this fact. 
Peter Kivy (2011) questions the consistency of a relevant passage in Hume’s 
essay: 
A critic of a different age or nation ... must place himself in the same 
situation as the audience, in order to form a true judgment of the oration. In 
like manner, when any work is addressed to the public, though I should 
have a friendship or enmity with the author, I must depart from this 
situation; and considering myself as a man in general, forget, if possible, 
my individual being and my peculiar circumstances. (E-ST, p. 276) 
He thinks that the first part of this passage corresponds to what he calls ‘the method 
of Historicism’,19 but the second part, in contrast, corresponds to what C. S. Lewis 
calls ‘the method of The Unchanging Human Heart’ (Kivy 2011, p. 112-113). If 
Kivy is right, then the freedom-from-prejudice requirement is inconsistent, as it is 
impossible for a critic to place herself in a particular situation and at the same time 
holds on to nothing more than the unchanging human heart. 
19 This label does not fully capture Hume’s idea, as he does not focus only on artworks from a 
different age, but also those from a different nation. 
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 The problem of Kivy’s reading is that he misunderstands the second part of the 
passage. When Hume uses the term ‘a man in general’, the contrast in his mind is 
that between features that are tied to that particular person and those that are not. 
When an author addresses her work to the public, she does not put into it features 
that are accessible only to some particular individuals among her intended audience. 
Rather, the relevant features should be accessible for everyone sharing that point of 
view. When I read the work, if I have my response because of my being the 
particular person I am, then this response is not relevant to the work. Therefore, what 
Hume is saying is not that I should forget any peculiarities, but just ‘my individual 
being’ and ‘my peculiar circumstances’. What remains would be something that can 
be shared by other people, and that is what it means to consider myself as ‘a man in 
general’. 
Understood in this way, the alleged inconsistency is resolved. When I adopt the 
intended viewpoint, the relevant features of it, however peculiar they are, are not my 
peculiarities, and can be general to everyone who adopts it.  
The kind of freedom here is a condition in which a person is not tied to any 
particular viewpoint, but is able to switch easily from one viewpoint to another, 
depending on what the artwork requires. Also, a true judge is not required to forget 
herself entirely. All that is required is that her judgement be made from the intended 
viewpoint. She can at the same time be fully aware of how the artwork appears to her 
from her own personal viewpoint. 
This requirement apparently makes Hume’s view a version of relativism, as the 
beauty of an artwork is relative to a particular viewpoint. An artwork is not beautiful 
simpliciter, but beautiful for the intended audience. This looks very like the relativist 
analysis of the structure of judgements of beauty: ‘An object O is beautiful for a 
certain group of people P’. This might make it perplexing why a particular 
viewpoint—that of the intended audience—should be privileged over the others. It 
should be possible for critics to agree on the judgement that an artwork is beautiful 
for its intended audience, while at the same time judge that it is ugly for some other 
group of people. Insofar as there is an agreement over the former judgement, there 
seems to be no reason to reject the latter one, as well as many other judgements made 
from other viewpoints. Perhaps a critic might even be justified to make the former 
judgement on the basis of authentic reports from the intended audience, without 
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 herself adopting their viewpoint. Why does Hume make such a strong claim that 
when the intended viewpoint is not adopted, a critic’s sentiments ‘are perverted’ 
(E-ST, p. 277)? 
Hume does not address this problem in ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, but a 
possible answer could be constructed out of what we have discussed so far. Earlier in 
Chapter 7, it has been mentioned that the word ‘beauty’ is a term in general language, 
which refers to a certain quality which is generally accessible. This means a critic 
must be able to perceive the beauty in making a judgement of beauty. Judgements of 
beauty made wholly on the basis of testimony, without the critic being able to 
perceive the beauty, are thus ruled out. Given this requirement of general 
accessibility, to say that beauty is relative to a certain viewpoint implies that the 
viewpoint should be generally adoptable. One possible candidate of such a viewpoint 
is one which consists of elements common to the whole species, which corresponds 
to the method of The Unchanging Human Heart. The problem of such a viewpoint is 
that, when it is adopted, we do not have enough resources to understand some 
qualities in an artwork embedded in a certain cultural background.  
This problem prompts us to consider another option, that is, the viewpoint of the 
intended audience, which corresponds to the method of Historicism. This seems to be 
a better option, as the cultural content of an artwork, if intelligible, should be 
accessible to the intended audience. Or perhaps we may say that an artwork is 
intended to be understandable for its intended audience. However, there might seem 
to be another problem, that is, it is not obvious how it can be a general viewpoint. 
The sense in which such a viewpoint is general here is not that it is thin in details, but 
that, as we have shown above, it does not involve features peculiar to some particular 
individual(s), and hence is generally adoptable for the common people. The adoption 
of it would not require some knowledge of the intended audience that is not publicly 
communicable, so that any critic with a fair level of intelligence could form an idea 
of it. 
From these considerations, we can see that only the viewpoint of the intended 
audience could fit with the nature of the word ‘beauty’ as a general term. 20 
20 It might be objected that perhaps there are other candidate viewpoints we haven’t considered. 
Perhaps someone can just adopt a viewpoint that is consistent with the intended viewpoint. This 
cannot be right, as some completely irrelevant viewpoint could be consistent with the intended one. 
Another suggestion would be that someone can adopt a viewpoint which completely coincides with 
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 Therefore, when a critic does not adopt this viewpoint when she judges the beauty of 
an artwork, she is not following the linguistic convention of the usage of the word 
‘beauty’, so that her judgement should be rejected.  
Here we can see that Hume’s view is quite different from relativism. For a 
relativist, the different viewpoints adopted by different people are on a par; but for 
Hume, there is one and only one viewpoint that is proper to the judgement of beauty. 
If we consider these two views further, we can also find that the relation between the 
viewpoint and the critic is not the same in these views. The relativist associates the 
viewpoint to the critic, so that which viewpoint is adopted depends on who the critic 
is. In contrast, for Hume, the viewpoint is instead associated with the artwork, so that 
it is the artwork, as created in a particular historical situation by an artist acting on 
certain intentions, which determines which viewpoint should be adopted. Perhaps we 
might say that an artwork has an intrinsic requirement concerning which viewpoint 
should be adopted in judging its beauty. It should be clear now that Hume’s view is 
not a version of relativism. 
There is another problem concerning the freedom-from-prejudice requirement, 
which is related to the later discussion in ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ of the two 
blameless sources of variation. There seems to be some tension between these two 
parts of Hume’s essay. The freedom-from-prejudice requirement seems to have 
eliminated the idiosyncrasies among different true judges by demanding them to 
adopt the intended viewpoint; on the other hand, the allowance of two blameless 
sources of variation just brings back the individual differences. How could this 
tension be resolved?  
that of the intended audience in aspects relevant to the appreciation of the artwork, but nonetheless 
they are different in the irrelevant aspects. It seems these two viewpoints are in effect equivalent, but 
if Hume really thinks that artworks are shaped by the artist’s idea of her intended audience, we should 
still not accept this proposal. On the one hand, if a critic knows that the viewpoint she adopts 
completely coincides in the relevant aspects with that of the intended audience, she has no reason to 
prefer the former over the latter. On the other hand, if the viewpoint she adopts just happens to 
coincide with the intended one, then it seems she would not be able to justify her decision. We should 
bear in mind that Hume is focusing on art criticism here. When a critic is choosing among different 
possible viewpoints, in so far as art criticism is considered as an activity which concerns whether an 
artwork is truly beautiful, she should choose the viewpoint which she is justified to believe that it 
shows her the artwork’s true beauty. If the two viewpoints coincide just by chance, then it seems she 
can justify her decision only if she knows that they are in effect equivalent in the relevant aspects, but 
that is possible only if she has already perceived the true beauty of that artwork from the intended 
viewpoint. This means that, again, she has no reason to prefer her viewpoint over the intended one. 
How about reasons which appeal to the difference between the two viewpoints in aspect irrelevant to 
art criticism? Since Hume is focusing on art criticism in his essay, he does not need to respond to this 
question. 
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 Given the assumption of a common human nature, everyone having the same 
sound taste, adopting the same viewpoint, and being in the same external 
circumstances should be pleased, or displeased, by the same artwork. The same 
artwork can be beautiful and deformed at the same time if critics adopt different 
viewpoints. It is the role of the freedom-from-prejudice requirement to prevent 
variations caused by differences in the viewpoints adopted. However, as shown in 
Chapter 7, adopting the same viewpoint does not prevent variations in the degree of 
force or vivacity of the pleasure or pain felt. The two blameless sources of variation 
comprise factors which affect the natural relations between the idea of the critic 
herself and that of the intended audience. Indeed, different critics inevitably stand in 
different relations with the intended audience. It is easier for us to sympathize with 
those whose humour resembles ours, and also those whose culture is similar, 
contiguous, or causally connected to our own culture. This leads to an inevitable 
variation in the degree of force or vivacity to be communicated through sympathy, 
and thus the idea of pleasure or pain is enlivened to different degrees for each critic. 
The variation of the degree of force or vivacity of the pleasure or pain implies a 
corresponding variation in the degree of our approbation or blame, as Hume holds 
that ‘[t]he very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. ... Our approbation is 
imply’d in the immediate pleasure they convey to us’ (T 3.1.2.3). However, insofar 
as the same viewpoint is adopted, pleasure would not become pain, and hence beauty 
would not become deformity, and vice versa. Therefore, the two sources of variation 
‘are not sufficient indeed to confound all the boundaries of beauty and deformity, but 
will often serve to produce a difference in the degrees of our approbation or blame’ 
(ST, p. 280).  
For ‘a man of learning and reflection’, he is well aware of the influence of these 
two sources of variation, and hence ‘can make allowance for these peculiarities of 
manners’ (E-ST, p. 282). A true judge is surely also such a man of learning and 
reflection for Hume. What is the kind of allowance made by such a critic? Hume 
does not deny that it can be a correction of the sentiment, but given the involuntary 
nature of the sentiment, this is extremely difficult. Nonetheless, such a man of 
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 learning can at least make a correction of the language employed in pronouncing his 
judgement.21 
We can now see that the apparent tension between the freedom-from-prejudice 
requirement and the two blameless sources of variation can be resolved easily. Once 
we know that the freedom-from-prejudice requirement concerns the way we obtain 
the pleasure or pain proper for the judgement of beauty and deformity, and that the 
two blameless sources of variation concern the actual degree of force or vivacity of 
that pleasure or pain, we realise that they concern different though related issues, so 
there is indeed no tension between them. 
Lastly, with our better understanding of Hume’s discussion on the two sources 
of blameless variation, we can see how exactly this consideration is connected to the 
previous parts of his essay. Having provided a philosophical analysis of the second 
species of common sense, Hume has in fact just shown that the variety of taste 
described in the beginning of the essay can be reduced, because the taste of people 
converge in virtue of improving their ability to make judgements of beauty. However, 
a sameness in the judgement of beauty they make does not imply sameness in the 
sentiment they have. Even when all defects are eliminated, and everyone becomes a 
true judge, particular judges still inevitably stand in different relations to the intended 
audience, and as a result their sentiments inevitable vary in degree of force and 
vivacity. However, since allowance can be made to offset such variations in 
formulating judgements of beauty, we neither need to nor could remove them. In 
short, the variety of taste is controlled, but can never be eliminated. 
  
21 Perhaps the ability to correct the language used in formulating one’s own judgement of beauty is 
also one of the reasons why good sense is required for true judges. If this is also what Hume would 
agree, we might wonder why he does not mention this contribution of good sense in his discussion of 
it. A possible reason is that the focus there is on how a critic could feel the proper sentiment, but not 
how to express the judgement made on the basis of the sentiment felt. 
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 Chapter 13 
Moral Prejudice 
 
In Hume’s discussion of the external blameless sources of variation, he holds that if 
the artwork incorporates moral principles that are different from ours, or in order 
words, if the artwork involves some moral prejudice, it is both impossible and 
improper for us to enter into that sentiment which allows us to relish it (E-ST, p. 282). 
Hereafter these two claims will be referred to as the psychological impossibility22 
claim and the normative claim respectively. Hume does not provide a detailed 
explanation for these two claims. At most we are told that ‘a very violent effort’ is 
needed to alter a person’s own moral principles, and that a person is ‘justly jealous of’ 
her own moral principles the rectitude of which she is confident of (E-ST, p. 283). 
However, this only puts the same claims in another way.  
Worse still, apart from lacking sufficient explanation, the two claims above 
appear to contradict the freedom-from-prejudice requirement. Following Hume, we 
might take a poem as an example. Assume that in this poem, judging from our moral 
principles, ‘vicious manners are described, without being marked with the proper 
characters of blame and disapprobation’ (E-ST, p. 282). Since the purpose of poetry 
is ‘to please by means of the passions and the imagination’ (E-ST, p. 277), we can 
say that the intended audience of this poem are those who will be pleased by it by 
means of the passions and the imagination. However, we are morally displeased to 
find that vicious characters or manners are not properly blamed or punished. 
Therefore, we are not the intended audience. Note that it is not the description of the 
vicious characters or manners taken in itself that causes the problem; rather, it is the 
22 By ‘impossibility’ I do not mean a strict impossibility, in which case I would have contradicted 
Hume’s allowance that one could nonetheless alter one’s moral principles and enter into that alien 
sentiment if ‘a very violent effort’ is made. The kind of impossibilities in my mind can be illustrated 
in this way: imagine that an ordinary person is asked to use her foot to hold a pen and draw as well as 
she could as using her hand. In ordinary discourse, we would happily allow people to say without 
qualification that it is impossible, while at the same time be fully aware that in certain extreme cases, 
such as if her arms were amputated, she might make ‘a very violent effort’ and turn such an 
‘impossibility’ into a possibility. If this example does not work, consider some extremely difficult 
yoga poses or skills in artistic gymnastics. Although it seems in some of such cases, even a very 
violent effort might still not be enough to change the impossibilities into possibilities. In short, the 
kind of impossibilities here is relative to an ordinary human being under ordinary circumstances. 
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 absence of proper blame and punishment that makes the poem displeasing. The 
freedom-from-prejudice requirement demands us to adopt the viewpoint of the 
intended audience in judging the beauty of this poem. That means we should enter 
into the sentiment of the intended audience, and be pleased by the poem in which 
vicious characters or manners are not properly punished; but this is claimed to be 
impossible and improper later on in Hume’s essay.  
This problem is formulated by Michelle Mason (2001) as what she calls ‘the 
moral prejudice dilemma’ (p. 60b).23 As a result of these contradictory claims, 
Mason thinks that a critic should either overlook her own moral principles in judging 
the poem, or insist on her moral principles and hence fail to be a true judge. This 
formulation is not quite right, as the first horn of it ignores Hume’s psychological 
impossibility claim. Therefore, the consequence might be better put in this way: our 
inability to alter our moral principles means that it is impossible in such cases for us 
to be free from prejudice in judging the beauty of the artwork, and this failure is 
morally proper. This consequence does not seem to be attractive. In order to evaluate 
Hume’s position, this chapter will start with an attempt to accurately understand why 
exactly Hume makes the psychological impossibility claim and the normative claim. 
This understanding will then allow us to see what consequences can be attributed to 
his position, and to evaluate it accordingly. 
Hume’s two claims concerning cases of moral prejudice should be considered 
separately, and we shall start with the normative claim. For Hume, what it means to 
say that something is improper for us to do can be understood by looking at his idea 
of obligation, as it can be viewed as saying that we have an obligation not to perform 
it: 
All morality depends upon our sentiments; and when any action, or quality 
of the mind, pleases us after a certain manner, we say it is virtuous; and 
when the neglect, or non-performance of it, displeases us after a like 
manner, we say that we lie under an obligation to perform it. (T 3.2.5.4) 
Accordingly, if something is improper for us to do, that just means that the 
performance of it displeases us after a certain manner. Where there is any moral 
prejudice, the absence of proper blame and punishment for vicious characters or 
23 Works cited from The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, as well as other publications which 
have two columns on one page, will be cited with page numbers followed by an English letter ‘a’ or 
‘b’, which stands for the left column and the right column respectively. 
80 
                                                 
 manners is a sign that ‘the limits of vice and virtue’ are confounded, and this 
displeases us (E-ST, p. 283). This means we lie under an obligation to avoid 
confounding the limits of vice and virtue. It we failed to meet this obligation, this 
shows that our own character is morally defective. If we were to adopt the viewpoint 
of the intended audience and enter into the sentiment of them, we would then not be 
displeased by the confounded limits of vice and virtue. Such an idea of ourselves is 
displeasing, so we have the obligation not to enter into the sentiment of the intended 
audience, that is, it is improper for us to do so. 
The reasoning behind the psychological impossibility claim is much more 
difficult to understand. In Chapter 7 we have seen that to adopt the viewpoint of the 
intended audience is to sympathise with them. This involves the formation of an idea 
of their pleasure, and by the communication of force and vivacity from a critic’s idea 
of her own self to her idea of the intended audience, and finally to the idea of their 
pleasure, this idea of pleasure is enlivened to be that very pleasure. Therefore, if it is 
impossible for us to adopt the viewpoint of the intended audience in the case of 
moral prejudice, there is probably something going wrong in this process.  
We might separate the process of sympathy into two parts: the first is the 
formation of the idea of the pleasure of the intended audience, and the second part is 
the communication of the force and vivacity among ideas. At first glance, both parts 
in the case of moral prejudice seem to be as normal as in the innocent case. We 
should have no difficulty in forming an idea of the pleasure of the intended audience. 
That we find it improper to enter into their sentiments presupposes our knowledge of 
their pleasure. On the other hand, the natural relations between the idea of our own 
selves and our idea of the intended audience should not be so weak as to be 
completely inoperative. After all, all human beings resemble each other more than 
other species of animals, but it is arguably true that we can also sympathise with 
animals. Merely holding different moral principles should not be a difference so 
destructive to the operation of sympathy. A more careful diagnosis is required to 
unveil the problem. 
We should start with an investigation of the idea of the pleasure of the intended 
audience. How is it formed? Does the existence of moral prejudice affect the 
formation of it? It has been shown in Chapter 7 how an idea of the pleasure of the 
intended audience is formed in an innocent case. It should be helpful for us to see 
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 how the account presented there might apply to a poem in which vicious character or 
manners receive proper blame or punishment first. Imagine a poem, intended to be 
recited to Tibetans, which describes sky burial, the most widely practiced form of 
burial in Tibet. It is believed that, according to the teaching of Tibetan Buddhism, 
after a person dies, to have his own body to be eaten by hungry predatory birds is the 
last generous and virtuous thing he could ‘do’ in this world. In this poem, a young 
Tibetan man goes to the sky burial site right before the rogyapas (body-breakers) 
disassemble the body of his deceased father who is a pious Buddhist. This is 
forbidden by the rule that relatives of the deceased person are not allowed to enter 
the site. This young man wants to stop the ceremony and get back his father’s body, 
but fails to do so. After that, he is severely punished by lamas.  
When we read this poem, we might at first be displeased by this kind of burial, 
because it is too different from the kinds of burial practiced in our own culture, and 
even conflicts with our attitude towards the bodies of deceased people. However, 
after a study of the cultural background of this practice, we come to understand the 
religious and moral meaning of it. With such factual knowledge, we know that it is 
sacred and virtuous for Tibetans. As the young man in the poem attempts to stop the 
sky burial of his father, we can now understand his action as an attempt to stop 
something sacred and virtuous from happening. Given this understanding, we have 
an idea of how the intended audience sees what the young Tibetan man does. All 
these are matters of fact, which are objects of reason.  
Next, we can move on to matters of sentiment. In our own culture, preventing 
something virtuous from being done is a vice which displeases us. A general rule is 
formed on the observation that such behaviour is generally followed by a feeling of 
pain, so that whenever an idea of such behaviour is present in our mind, the 
imagination moves naturally from this idea to an idea of pain. The two ideas are 
connected by the natural relation of cause and effect. When we have an idea of the 
intended audience in mind, together with the relevant knowledge of their culture, we 
imagine and come to have an idea of their view of the action described in the poem. 
Then, our imagination naturally moves from this latter idea to an idea of their pain, 
in virtue of the relation of cause and effect between them. The reason why the 
general rule involved here is one of our own general rules but not one of the intended 
audience’s is that it does not make sense to say that our own mind is affected by 
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 some other people’s general rules. No matter what general rules the intended 
audience holds, it is impossible for our imagination to blindly and unreflectively 
move from one idea to another idea according to general rules in their mind. In virtue 
of the same mechanism, the proper punishment received by the young Tibetan man 
produces in our mind an idea of the pleasure of the intended audience. 
A comment should be added here concerning the general rule. I propose that 
such a general rule is what Hume calls a ‘moral principle’ in his discussion on the 
case of moral prejudice. A moral principle should be considered as a particular 
manifestation of original principles of human nature.24 It cannot be an original 
principle itself, as Hume’s assumption of the common human nature would then 
deny the possibility of there being different moral principles among different cultures. 
Moreover, as general rules are something which connect ideas, they are different 
from original principles of human nature, which determine what sentiment 
(impression) will be caused by what happens in our mind. Since the moral principles 
involved in Hume’s discussion of moral prejudice can determine whether a critic can 
form an idea of pleasure or pain from an idea of the characters or manners described 
in an artwork, it should be a general rule, rather than an original principle. 
On the other hand, a moral principle must not be overly specific. For example, 
if there is a general rule which connects an idea of pain with a highly specific idea of 
somebody who goes into the site of sky burial and stops the ceremony, then it cannot 
be possessed by anybody who lives in a culture which does not have the practice of 
sky burial, as repeated experiences of sky burial would not be available for the 
formation of custom in the imagination. Without that general rule, when such a 
person reads the poem in the above example, her imagination cannot move from the 
former idea to the latter. This just means that even if she has all the relevant factual 
knowledge, her imagination still cannot naturally move from her idea of the action to 
any idea of pain. It does not mean that she cannot arbitrarily relate these two ideas 
together. However, the relation of ideas here in this case would be just a 
philosophical relation; or more precisely, it is just another piece of fact. In the 
absence of a natural relation, the communication of force and vivacity between ideas 
24 Since these original principles are not something we can directly know, we can only form on the 
basis of experience some general rules which trace their particular manifestations. These general rules 
are not always explicitly formulated, as the common people might only have their imagination be 
influenced by them, but do not know explicitly what they are. Only those more reflective people, such 
as philosophers, would have some of their general rules explicitly formulated. 
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 that is requisite for sympathy is no longer possible. The force and vivacity of my idea 
of my own self can be communicated to my idea of the intended audience; but this 
latter idea cannot communicate its force and vivacity to any idea of pain related to it 
just by philosophical relation. As a result, even in a case where there is no conflict 
between moral principles, the critic also cannot enter into the sentiment of the 
intended audience. This should not be allowed by Hume, so what he calls ‘moral 
principle’ should not be too specific. A general rule which connects an idea of the 
prevention of virtuous action with an idea of pain would be general enough to count 
as a moral principle. 
We can now move on to a case which involves moral prejudice. We can 
imagine another poem, in which almost all the same events are described, except that 
the young Tibetan man is not properly punished. This case is much more 
complicated. First of all, who would be the intended audience? There seems to be 
two candidate groups of the intended audience. On the one hand, as the end of poetry 
is ‘to please by means of the passions and the imagination’, the intended audience 
seem to be those who would be pleased by this poem. On the other hand, when we 
try to adopt the viewpoint of the intended audience, that is, when we imagine how 
they would react to the poem, we can only have an idea of an intended audience 
which is naturally connected to an idea of pain. Here is the reason. Given all the 
relevant knowledge, we know that the action of the young Tibetan man is an attempt 
to prevent something virtuous from happening. This must be agreed by the intended 
audience. As we are trying to formulate a case of moral prejudice, this requires that 
the different moral principles should concern the same action understood in the same 
way, but differ only in whether pain or pleasure follows. According to our own 
relevant general rule, which has been shown above to be the only possible one which 
can affect the operation of our own mind, the above idea of the action of the young 
Tibetan man is only naturally connected to an idea of pain. Therefore, when we 
imagine the sentiment of the intended audience by considering how they would 
understand the poem, only an idea of pain could be formed and naturally connected 
to our idea of them.  
This is not to deny that an idea of pleasure might be arbitrarily related to our 
idea of the intended audience; but the relation in this case would then be a 
philosophical relation, which is either a matter of fact, or a relation of ideas. Perhaps 
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 we might have a chance to directly observe the reaction of some group of Tibetans, 
who are the intended Tibetan audience and thus are actually pleased by the poem, so 
that the philosophical relation is a matter of fact; or we might reason from the 
assumption that the end of poetry is to please to the conclusion that the intended 
audience should be pleased by the poem, so that the philosophical relation is a 
relation of ideas. 
In brief, in this case of moral prejudice, our idea of the intended audience is 
related to an idea of pleasure through a philosophical relation, and to an idea of pain 
through a natural relation. Since the process of sympathy requires the ideas involved 
to be connected by natural relations, as the communication of force and vivacity 
depends on natural relations but not philosophical relations, we can now see why 
Hume thinks that it is impossible for us to enter into the sentiment of the intended 
audience in cases involving moral prejudice. The problem is not located at the 
connection between the idea of our own self and the idea of the intended audience; 
rather, it is located at the connection between the idea of the intended audience and 
the idea of pleasure. This latter connection is a philosophical relation, and that means 
no matter how much force and vivacity is added to the idea of the intended audience, 
the force and vivacity cannot be further communicated to the idea of pleasure, and 
hence it cannot be strengthened to become that very pleasure itself. In contrast, as the 
idea of the intended audience is naturally related to the idea of pain, the process of 
sympathy is not obstructed, and therefore the idea of pain can become the very pain 
itself. This means that when we sympathise with the intended audience, that is, when 
we try to adopt their viewpoint, although we might know that they are pleased by the 
poem, the only sentiment we can feel is pain, not pleasure. It is thus impossible for 
us to enter into the sentiment of the intended audience. 
Now we have explained both the psychological impossibility claim and the 
normative claim. We can then proceed to see what consequence these two claims 
have. Hume thinks that when we read a poem like the one in the second example 
above, we can only find the poem deformed (E-ST, p. 282). This is because our 
judgement of beauty is made on the basis of the sentiment felt, and since we can only 
feel pain, we judge it to be deformed. However, one might ask, why does not Hume 
allow in this case that we might make allowance for the difference in sentiment felt 
which is caused by external factors? An educated person might be able to recognise 
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 the influence of the difference in moral principles, and it seems quite possible for her 
to correct her language or sentiment in making the judgement of beauty. What is the 
reason for Hume’s denial of this possibility? 
Here is a simple reply. In last chapter, it has been pointed out that the allowance 
that is provided by the correction of language or sentiment concerns the variations in 
the degree of the fore and vivacity of the sentiment felt. Such variations are the 
effects of the influence of the internal frame of the mind and the external situation 
caused on the operation of sympathy. As sympathy is just a mechanism of the mind 
by which an idea is enlivened to become a passion, it cannot change pleasure into 
pain, or pain into pleasure. Therefore, in the case of the poem in question, where the 
moral prejudice causes us to feel pain while the intended audience should feel 
pleasure, the kind of allowance mentioned in the discussion of blameless variations 
is not applicable.  
This reply is not fully satisfactory, as it can be further questioned why Hume 
does not allow any correction of language or sentiment which could deal with such 
cases. Apart from his more fundamental thought that a judgement of beauty should 
be based on the sentiment genuinely felt, there seems to be no strong reason to deny 
that a critic can judge something to be beautiful when he is aware of the fact that he 
is under the influence of moral prejudice and is thus actually feeling pain. Perhaps 
one of Hume’s worries is that when the actual sentiment felt does not correspond to 
that of the intended audience, the critic could have no reference point to rank the 
artwork within the particular genre to which it belongs. Her pain tells her nothing 
about how strong the pleasure of the intended audience would be relative to the 
pleasure occasioned by other works in the same genre. We might grant that this is a 
practical problem, but it is not enough to support the conclusion that such a 
correction is in principle impossible. It might be very difficult to achieve a precise 
ranking under the influence of moral prejudice, but given that it is also extremely 
difficult to be a true judge, merely being difficult could not be counted as a decisive 
reason in support of Hume’s position. It might be argued that indeed Hume is also 
aware of this weakness of his view, and that is why he seems to allow that our 
sentiment could be changed through some very violent effort (E-ST, p. 283). We 
have no way to rescue Hume’s view from this question, so we will leave it as such. 
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 Chapter 14 
Controversies 
 
Hume’s essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ has raised many interpretative problems 
and has been the object of many discussions in contemporary aesthetics. In this 
chapter, a few of them will be responded to on the basis of the interpretation we have 
developed in previous chapters.  
 
A. Levinson’s ‘Real Problem’ 
In Levinson (2006), the author presents a ‘real problem’ which he considers as one 
likely to be raised by a modern reader of Hume’s ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. 
Levinson admits that his paper ‘is not primarily an exercise in historical scholarship 
(p. 367),’ i.e. he does not claim that this problem is a problem for Hume, but he just 
wants to show that a solution to it could be found in Hume’s essay. In our discussion 
below, it will be shown that both Levinson’s problem and solution are based upon 
his misunderstanding of Hume’s essay, and if we re-formulate his problem according 
to our interpretation, we can see that it should not be in any sense a problem for 
Hume. 
Levinson’s ‘real problem’ could be briefly summarised as follows: given that I 
am not an ideal judge, the artworks I enjoy and prefer are not the same as those 
enjoyed and preferred by ideal judges. I simply cannot share their enjoyment because 
of the difference in our taste. For me, those artworks approved by ideal judges are 
less enjoyable than those which I like. Why should I care what an ideal judge likes? 
Why should the joint verdict offered by ideal judges have any bearing on my taste, so 
that I should like what I do not like, or try to become more like an ideal judge? 
A problem immediately arises: Levinson seems to be assuming that, for Hume, 
art criticism is at least mainly an activity which helps us maximise our enjoyment in 
art. It suggests that if it can be shown that following the joint verdict of true judges 
could maximise our enjoyment in art, then it justifies the view that we should care 
about their joint verdict. Although it can be agreed that true judges can determine 
which artworks can provide the highest enjoyment human beings are capable of 
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 having, as suggested in Hume’s discussion of delicacy of taste (E-ST, p. 274), it does 
not follow that enjoyment maximisation is the aim of art criticism, nor does it follow 
that true judges necessarily enjoy only those artworks judged by them to be the best. 
Chapter 9 has shown that art criticism is an activity which answers to the demand of 
making judgements of beauty, when ‘beauty’ is taken as a term in general language. 
Its aim is to correctly judge the beauty of artworks, which is understood as the power 
of some qualities in artworks which naturally pleases when a critic is in a sound state 
of internal organs (and under the appropriate external circumstances). However, later 
in Chapter 12, the role and effect of sympathy were identified. We know that if the 
natural relations between the critic’s idea of the intended audience and her idea of 
herself are weak, she is not able to feel much pleasure from considering an artwork, 
even if she judges it to be good. Therefore, Hume’s view allows that, depending on 
the qualities of the intended audience, a true judge might enjoy more a lesser artwork 
than a better one. Insofar as the correction of language is appropriately made, a 
critic’s preference and enjoyment are independent of her judgement of beauty. 
Therefore, for Hume, art criticism should not be conceived as an activity which aims 
at the maximisation of enjoyment, as this is irrelevant to its aim of correctly judging 
the beauty of artwork.  
Also, the claim that the best artworks can provide the highest enjoyment human 
beings are capable of having should not be understood as implying that all true 
judges are equally pleased by such artworks. At most, the highest enjoyment an 
artwork could afford is only accessible to those true judges in the intended audience, 
or those who can fully correct their sentiment beyond merely correcting their 
language, so that they are pleased to the same extent as a true judge among the intend 
audience. However, this is not part of the requirement for a critic to be a true judge. 
In other words, being a true judge does not make a person always capable of having 
the highest enjoyment affordable by every artwork. This shows that, if it should be 
justified that the joint verdict of true judges should be listened to, Hume would never 
think that the justification comes from the prospect of highest enjoyment. 
As for Levinson’s solution to the ‘real problem’, in addition to the same 
problematic assumption discussed above, it also involves another problem. His 
solution relies heavily on the idea that a true judge is ‘a reliable indicator or identifier 
of artistic value, that is, intrinsically-worthwhile-experience-affording capacity—in 
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 its varying degrees’ (Levinson 2006, p. 380). Levinson thinks that we need to test 
critics by checking whether they can fully appreciate the masterworks, and after their 
status as true judge has been established, we have a reason to attend to their joint 
verdict, as they are ‘our best barometers of the artistic value of works of art generally’ 
(ibid, p. 381). This means that our reason to attend to the joint verdict of true judges 
depends on the prior establishment of their status as true judge. However, even if we 
set aside the impossibility of establishing who the true judges are, and weaken 
Levinson’s view to the extent that we have a reason to attend to the verdict of judges 
who are merely better than us in virtue of their superior but less than ideal taste, we 
should still not accept Levinson’s view. According to the account provided in 
Chapter 9, we need not establish the superiority of a critic’s taste before our 
assessment of her judgement; rather, our approbation of her taste is implied by our 
acceptance of her judgement. We ‘internalise’ her judgement, in the sense of coming 
to see an artwork in the same way as the critic sees it, and thus share her sentiment. 
We can then compare her judgement and our own one, so that we could determine 
whose judgement is better. If the critic’s judgement is better than ours, we accept that 
her taste performs better in this case. When we observe that the same critic usually 
makes better judgement of beauty, then we believe that the ability to make better 
judgement of beauty is part of her character, and admit that she is a better judge. 
Levinson’s worry should not be dismissed simply because of these 
misunderstandings. We should try to re-formulate it according to our interpretation to 
see if it could be revived. Levinson thinks that his ‘real problem’ is a question which 
‘most naturally arises in the mind of an ordinary, skeptical art-lover in regard to 
Hume’s solution to the problem of taste’ (ibid, p. 372). Perhaps the criticism 
presented above has misidentified the domain of the ‘real problem’—it is not a 
problem for art critics, but a problem for art-lovers. However, it will then make the 
‘real problem’ irrelevant to Hume’s essay, as ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ is a work 
which focuses on art criticism. It is directed to critics, that is, those who care about 
the true beauty of artworks. It should be reminded that, as presented in Chapter 8, the 
possibility of there being a standard of taste is secured by a consideration on 
examples drawn from art criticism, which concern the comparative merit of Ogilby 
and Milton, Bunyan and Addison (E-ST, p. 269). Thereafter, Hume does not extend 
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 his consideration beyond the realm of art criticism, and hence any interpretation 
which makes such an extension is not a fair interpretation of Hume’s view.  
From Levinson’s formulation of the ‘real problem’, although no clear 
characterisation of art-lovers is provided, we can still see that they are the kind of 
people whose interest lies on the maximisation of enjoyment afforded by artworks, 
and at most only derivatively on the true beauty of artworks. As Levinson puts it: 
The crucial practical, as opposed to exegetical, question concerning 
Hume’s solution to the problem of taste is why one should care what is 
truly beautiful, if one accepts Hume’s account of how such things are 
identified, to wit, through the converging verdicts of ideal critics. 
(Levinson 2006, p. 372-373) 
If art-lovers’ main concern is true beauty, instead of the maximisation of their own 
enjoyment, the practical question ‘why one should care what is truly beautiful’ 
would not make any sense. As a result, the ‘real problem’ is not really a problem for 
Hume, at least within the scope of ‘Of the Standard of Taste’.  
Moreover, even if we allow that Hume—being a philosopher, but not merely the 
author of that essay—should in some sense respond to this problem, it is still not 
very clear how important the ‘real problem’ is. After all, if the problem is how one 
should maximise her enjoyment, it is just a personal matter. Many factors figure in 
her consideration, including her education level, prior exposure to the art world, 
sensibility to beauty, amount of leisure, humour, cultural environment, etc. These 
should all be taken into account in her cost-benefit analysis. Due to the particularity 
and complexity of such concerns, there is hardly any interesting general answer to be 
provided.  
If we only focus on the estimation of enjoyment to be afforded by the 
appreciation of artworks, we still cannot see the significance of the ‘real problem’. 
The standard of taste would only be interesting to those who care about what is truly 
beautiful. There is no reason to impose on Hume any claim which requires everyone 
to be bound by a standard of taste. If a person just wants to maximise her enjoyment, 
why should Hume try to force or convince her to listen to the joint verdict of true 
judges? We have pointed out that making correct judgements of the beauty of 
artworks and maximising one’s own enjoyment of art need not coincide. Although it 
is claimed that the best artworks could afford the highest enjoyment a human being is 
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 capable of having, it does not mean that such enjoyment must be able to offset all the 
effort and sacrifice required for a person to acquire the ability to enjoy it. All these 
are just practical, but not philosophical, considerations of life-planning for an 
individual person. Hume does not need to provide any answer to the ‘real problem’. 
 
B. A Circular Definition? 
One of the most famous criticisms of Hume’s ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ is the 
charge of circularity. It is roughly the view that Hume defines good works of art as 
those approved by good critics, and good critics as those who approve good works of 
art. One particular formulation of the problem is provided by Peter Kivy: 
(1) good works of art are works of art approved by good critics; (2) good 
critics are critics possessing five requisite qualities; and (3) critics 
possessing the five requisite qualities are critics who approve good works 
of art. (Kivy 1967, p. 60) 
Kivy’s own solution to this problem consists in an attempt to show that three of the 
five requisite qualities (delicacy, lack of prejudice, and good sense) can be defined 
without appealing to good artworks. Whether his attempt succeeds is not our concern 
here. Rather, a problem in the formulation of the problem itself should be considered. 
Kivy thinks that Hume defines good artworks in terms of good critics. However, 
this claim is questionable. The truth seems to be that Hume has not provided any 
definition of good artworks in his ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. Although it is true that 
good artworks are those approved by good critics, but it seems this just follows from 
the claim that good critics are those who approve good artworks. Merely being a true 
claim about good artworks does not mean that it is a definition of good artworks. 
Indeed, it would be strange that if Hume does really provide any definition of good 
artworks here. ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ is an essay on our judgement concerning 
the operation of taste in the realm of art criticism. It does not aim at telling its reader 
what is a good or bad artwork; rather, it aims at providing an account of how we 
could determine when our taste could be trusted in judging the beauty and deformity 
of artworks, and hence their goodness. It should be objected that beauty and 
deformity are not the only qualities which are relevant to the evaluation of artworks; 
but granted this problematic assumption, a correct understanding of the essay’s aim 
should not prompt us to expect any definition of good artworks. Hume would 
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 probably reserve this project of defining good artworks to art critics, or at least, to 
another occasion where he writes as an art critic. Some specific qualities which 
contribute to the beauty or deformity of artworks might be identified in such 
definition, but this is outside of our concerns here.  
This response might not be satisfactory, and it is in no way meant to be 
conclusive. A stronger reply to this charge of circularity is directed to the contention 
that Hume defines good critics in terms of good artworks, or, in particular, the 
second and third claim in Kivy’s formulation. Kivy’s second claim defines good 
critics as those possessing the five requisite qualities. This might seem to commit 
him to the view that these five qualities form a complete list of the requisite qualities, 
but this would not be something we would like to accept. We have seen previously in 
Chapter 10 that these five traits are found in experience to be contributive to the 
improvement of a person’s ability in judging the beauty of artworks. This makes it a 
contingent fact that they are thus associated with good critics, and we should better 
allow the possibility of there being some other qualities omitted by Hume.25 
A better way to formulate Kivy’s claims would be: 
(2’) Good critics are critics whose internal organs are sound;  
and  
(3’) Critics whose internal organs are sound approve of good works of art. 
However, although (3’) may not seem false to some readers, it should still be rejected, 
because Hume would not define those critics in this way. For Hume, (3’) would be 
too narrow. Critics whose state of internal organs is sound do not only approve good 
works of art. They do so in virtue of their taste, the operation of which is in an ideal 
condition, so that it can be trusted in judging the beauty and deformity of artworks. 
Even if we might assume for the sake of simplicity that beauty and deformity are the 
only factors which ultimately determine the artistic value of an artwork, so that a 
beautiful artwork is a good artwork, and a deformed one is bad, we should not think 
that Hume defines artistic beauty and deformity in terms of good and bad artworks. 
Rather, he tells us that: 
Some particular forms or qualities, from the original structure of the 
internal fabric, are calculated to please, and others to displease; and if they 
25 Examples of other qualities include ‘[e]motional receptivity or openness’ and ‘serenity of mind or 
capacity for reflection’ (Levinson 2006, p. 371), courage (Durà-Vilà 2014, p. 77). 
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 fail of their effect in any particular instance, it is from some apparent 
defect or imperfection in the organ. (E-ST, p. 271) 
Those which please in this way are beautiful, and those which displease are 
deformed. Accordingly, it seems fair to think that Hume implicitly defines beauty as 
the kind of forms or qualities which please in virtue of the original internal structure 
of the human mind, and deformity is the kind of forms or qualities which displease in 
the same manner. The internal structure referred to here is surely not the physical 
structure of the human mind. Rather, it is actually the totality of the original 
principles according to which passions are caused in the human mind. Therefore, it 
might be clearer to re-cast the definition as: beauty is the kind of forms or qualities 
which please according to certain original principles of the human mind, and 
deformity is the kind of forms or qualities which displease in the same manner. 
Given this general definition of beauty and deformity, we could then add a restriction 
that the forms or qualities should be considered from the viewpoint of the intended 
audience to make it a definition of artistic beauty and deformity. There is no need to 
mention good or bad artworks in this definition, and hence the charge that the 
definition is circular fails. 
It might be objected that my response is only effective against this particular 
version, as another circular definition could be found in Hume’s essay. Given the 
above definition of beauty and deformity, a circular definition can be formed by 
adding a second definition, which defines those original principles of the human 
mind mentioned in the first definition as the principles of human mind according to 
which beauty pleases and deformity displeases. Thus, those original principles of the 
human mind and beauty and deformity are defined in terms of each other.  
In response to this second version of a circular definition, the last thing we 
would do is to reject the first definition, as our acceptance of it grounds our rejection 
of the first version of the circular definition. Therefore, we should start by examining 
the second definition. We might ask first, is there any other way to define those 
original principles? A possibility seems to be to give an extensional definition which 
lists all those particular original principles, but two problems arise.  
First, these particular principles would probably be something which connect a 
certain impression of forms or qualities to pleasure or displeasure, but unless we 
appeal to a prior distinction between the pleasure of beauty and the displeasure of 
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 deformity and other kinds of pleasure and displeasure, it seems this list might include 
irrelevant original principles. This means we could not break the circle by giving an 
extensional definition.  
Second, we do not have direct access to such original principles. All we can 
have are just some observations of their particular manifestations, which is 
determined by external situations. From such observations, we might be able to form 
some general rules connecting certain forms or qualities with pleasure or displeasure, 
and perhaps we might also be able to reduce them into rules which are more general; 
but we could never know whether such general rules correspond exactly to those 
original principles. This means that it is impossible for us to provide any extensional 
definition. 
Hume would respond to the first problem by asserting that: 
[U]nder the term pleasure, we comprehend sensations, which are very 
different from each other, and which have only such a distant resemblance, 
as is requisite to make them be express’d by the same abstract term. (T 
3.1.2.4) 
Both ‘pleasure’ and ‘displeasure’ are abstract terms which refer to distinct sensations 
which have only a distant resemblance. That the same term is used should not lead us 
to think that we are not able to distinguish different kinds of pleasure and displeasure. 
We do as a matter of fact have a prior distinction of the pleasure of beauty and the 
displeasure of deformity and other kinds of pleasure and displeasure. Moreover, 
although we should also distinguish different kinds of pleasure and displeasure by 
the manners they are produced, we also know how to make such distinctions. Only 
when the forms or qualities are considered in general would the pleasure or 
displeasure produced be that of beauty or deformity. Should this response be 
accepted? Perhaps, but then Hume still needs to respond to the second problem. 
It seems Hume should agree with what the problem states. However, he might 
continue by saying that this is an inevitable result of his experimental method. Recall 
a passage cited in Chapter 1: 
And tho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as 
possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all 
effects from the simplest and fewest causes, ’tis still certain we cannot go 
beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the 
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 ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as 
presumptuous and chimerical. (T Intro. 8) 
On the one hand, we should aim at generalising the principles formed in our science 
of human nature as far as the limit of experience allows. On the other hand, Hume 
tells us from the very beginning that we cannot discover any ultimate original 
principles of human nature. This means we are indeed unable to have any clear idea 
of what he calls ‘original principles’. As we keep on generalising the principles 
already formed on our experience, we imagine that this process might continue. As it 
is certain that we must never be able to form principles more general than the 
ultimate original principles, we imagine that we might at last arrive at some general 
principles which correspond exactly to the original principles, despite the fact that 
we can never know this correspondence, and thus can never claim to have made such 
a discovery.  
Moreover, as ‘all reasonings from experience are founded on the supposition, 
that the course of nature will continue uniformly the same’ (A 13), and Hume’s 
science of human nature is constituted by reasonings from experience, the uniformity 
of nature is a presupposition of Hume’s science of human nature. The existence of 
original principles of human nature is just a particular instance of this presupposition. 
Insofar as ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ is part of Hume’s enterprise of developing a 
science of human nature, the existence of original principles is an inevitable 
presupposition. Therefore, the two definitions in the second version of the circular 
definition should not be taken literally. The first definition might be clarified as 
saying that beauty is the kind of forms or qualities when considered in general are 
found to cause pleasure of beauty, and deformity is the kind of forms or qualities 
when consider in general are found to cause displeasure of deformity. The inclusion 
of the term ‘beauty’ in the definiens is harmless, as it refers to a certain kind of forms 
or qualities in the definiendum, but in the definiens, it refers to a certain kind of 
sentiment. Similarly for ‘deformity’. This revised definition does not affect our 
rejection of the first version of circular definition, as it still does not mention ‘good 
or bad artworks’.  
As for the second definition, it is now irrelevant to the first definition, so we 
need not revise it. The only term in the revised definition of beauty and deformity 
which seems to require a further definition is ‘in general’. We can say that ‘in 
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 general’ means in the absence of personal particular interest inaccessible to other 
people. Also, in order to approximate to the meaning carried by ‘original principle’, 
it should also function as a restriction on the way of considering the forms or 
qualities to the extent that the highest regularity and uniformity of experience could 
be achieved. It is not clear whether we can define ‘in general’ without mentioning 
the idea of ‘original principle but still capture fully the original thought expressed by 
the first definition. If not, perhaps this might support the thought that the existence of 
original principles is a presupposition of reasoning, rather than something acquired 
from experience. In any case, it seems a definition of ‘in general’ would not mention 
‘beauty’ and ‘deformity’, and hence there is no threat of circularity. 
 
C. Ideal Judges 
As the true standard of taste is identified as the joint verdict of true judges, we can 
find the true standard of taste only if we can consult the joint verdict of true judges. 
So if they are ideal, it means we cannot find the true standard of taste. What Hume 
says is just useless in practice. On the contrary, it is not clear how a real judge could 
possess all five traits of a true judge as perfections. This does not seem to be just a 
matter of rarity—it is simply impossible. 
Our discussion in Chapter11 has demonstrated that the true standard of taste as 
the joint verdict of true judges is just an imaginary standard. We imagine, but do not 
find in experience, some critics who have the best possible taste. This means that true 
judges are ideal. However, in order to be more confident of this conclusion, we 
should examine what reasons might be provided to support the view that true judges 
are real. 
James Shelley supports the view that true judges are ideal. His reason is a 
textual one, which appeals to Hume’s reference to the five traits as perfections 
(Shelley 1994, p. 439b).26 He thinks that even the two kinsmen in the wine tasting 
example from Don Quixote also do not possess delicacy of taste, because each of 
them fails to notice every ingredient in the wine, and hence they are not true judges. 
Stephanie Ross argues against Shelley by pointing out that the conditions of practice 
26 Note that Shelley maintains in the same article that a person might consult the true judges, and their 
joint verdict ‘can assure us that a particular difference of taste represents an inequality of taste’ 
(Shelley 2004, p. 438b-439a). It seems that he is contradicting himself by saying that true judges are 
ideal and that true judges can actually be consulted by non-ideal critics. 
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 and forming comparison cannot be understood as perfections because ‘they are not 
properly conceived of as whole or completed’, as they must involve ‘the gradual 
accumulation of experience’ (Ross 2008, p. 22-23). Also, she thinks that ‘it is always 
possible to engage in further practice and/or to entertain additional comparisons’, 
and this possibility obtains only for actual beings, so true judges are real (ibid, p. 23). 
Ross’s first reason cannot support her conclusion. In order for her first reason to 
be relevant, Ross has to deny that we have ideas formed by imagination which go 
beyond the boundary of experience, but we should not accept this consequence. That 
the conditions of practice and forming comparison must involve ‘the gradual 
accumulation of experience’ only holds for the ideas formed within the limit of 
experience. However, Hume thinks that, upon the repeated observations that more 
practice and more comparison formed can improve our judgement of beauty, our 
imagination continues its motion and imagines that for any judgement of beauty, it 
could be further improved by more practice and more comparison formed.  
In addition, it can also be observed repeatedly that the more practice and more 
comparison formed, the smaller is the improvement of our judgement. Therefore, our 
imagination also imagines that there will be some stage at which no further 
improvement is possible. At that stage, the critic would be ‘perfectly practiced’ and 
have formed ‘perfectly sufficient comparisons’.  
These two ideas of perfections are formed by the imagination, whose operation 
is not controlled by reason. That they are irrational, or could not be properly 
conceived, does not mean that we cannot have such ideas. Unless it has been shown 
in advance that the idea of a true judge is an idea formed totally within the limit of 
experience, Ross’s first reason cannot show that the two conditions of true judges are 
not conceived as perfections. Note that although Hume rejects the idea of going 
beyond the limit of experience in his science of human nature, he does not ask for a 
complete elimination of every idea formed by the imagination operating beyond the 
limit of experience. That we have such ideas is one of the facts of human nature, 
which calls for explanation, but not reformation. All Hume demands is that in 
rational enquiries, we should limit ourselves to employing only those ideas which 
stay within the limits of experience. 
As for Ross’s second reason, it needs to be clarified. If that ‘it is always 
possible to engage in further practice and/or to entertain additional comparisons’ can 
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 be counted as a reason against the construal of the two conditions as perfections, then 
it seems Ross is implicitly assuming that if the two conditions can be construed as 
perfections, then it is impossible to engage in further practice and/or to entertain 
additional comparisons, and her argument should be a modus tollens. If this is the 
case, then the conditional should be questioned. Why would the two conditions 
construed as perfections make it impossible to engage in further practice and/or to 
entertain additional comparisons? It is reasonable to say that in this case, further 
practice and additional comparisons will not improve the judgement of beauty made 
by a critic having these perfections, but if she wants to do so, she can.  
It seems Ross either actually means that it is always possible to improve one’s 
judgement of beauty by engaging in further practice and/or by entertaining additional 
comparisons, or her argument involves a hidden premise which is a false conditional, 
and hence should be rejected. A charitable reading should reject the second disjunct, 
so we should consider the first disjunct, which is a revised version of Ross’s second 
reason.  
Given what we have just said in our discussion of her first reason, it is obvious 
that this revised version is self-defeating. What it says is exactly what a person 
would think when her imagination has gone beyond the limit of experience. By 
reason alone, we can never arrive at the conclusion that improvement is always 
possible. It is by custom that our imagination makes us expect such a possibility. 
However, we have also seen that this cannot be the whole picture, as the imagination 
also leads a person to expect that, ultimately, no further improvement could be made. 
Ross then faces a dilemma: either she should deny that the imagination can go 
beyond experience, or accept that such an operation of the imagination also leads to 
the ideas of the two conditions construed as perfections. The first horn forces her to 
give up her second reason, both the original version and the revised version; the 
second horn forces her to accept that we have the two ideas which she wants to deny. 
No matter which horn she would choose, she fails to show that true judges are real. 
As a result, we can still understand the five traits as perfections which ‘can 
alone entitle a critic to [the] valuable character’ of true judge (E-ST, p. 278), and 
since actual judges cannot possess all such perfections, true judges are ideal. 
 
D. Standard of Taste: Rule or Joint Verdict 
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 So far in our discussion of the standard of taste, we have stuck to the characterisation 
of it as the joint verdict of true judges. However, in the earlier part of ‘Of the 
Standard of Taste’, there is a short but crucial paragraph, that is, paragraph 6, which 
seems to characterise it in another way: 
It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the various 
sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision, afforded, 
confirming one sentiment, and condemning another. (E-ST, p. 268) 
Some discussions have emerged concerning the relation between these two 
seemingly quite different characterisations.27 The most common way to express the 
problem is to ask whether Hume thinks that the standard of taste is a rule or a joint 
verdict. There is also a tendency to identify the rule mentioned in paragraph 6 with a 
general rule of art discussed later in Hume’s essay, and also to identify the decision 
with the joint verdict of true judges. As a result, there are two other formulations of 
the problem: whether the standard of taste is the set of general rules of art or the joint 
verdict of true judges? Or whether the standard of taste is a rule or a decision? The 
last formulation seems to have led people such as Wieand (1984) to focus on 
paragraph 6 and sometimes even to suspect that this paragraph provides inconsistent 
characterisations. However, the identifications of ‘rule’ and ‘decision’ in paragraph 6 
as ‘rule of art’ and ‘joint verdict’ respectively seem to have muddied the water, 
rather than to have contributed to our understanding of Hume’s essay. In the 
following, it will first be shown that both identifications are not well supported, and 
indeed should be rejected. This will involve an argument to show that the standard of 
taste cannot consist in general rules of art, and also a clarification of the relations 
between ‘rule’ and ‘decision’ in paragraph 6. Second, an account will be provided to 
show how paragraph 6 should be understood given Hume’s view that the standard of 
taste is the joint verdict of true judges; our suggestion is that there is also an actual 
but fallible standard of taste.  
Strictly speaking, both the identification of ‘rule’ with ‘rule of art’ and that of 
‘decision’ with ‘joint verdict’ lack textual evidence, as Hume has never explicitly 
made these identifications. For those who make the first identification, perhaps they 
are motivated by the fact that the only kind of rules discussed in Hume’s essay is 
what he calls alternatively ‘rules of composition’, ‘rules of criticism’, ‘rules of art’, 
27 Probably the most central texts on this problem are Wieand (1984) and Shelley (1994).  
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 ‘rules of beauty’.28 However, this could hardly be counted as an evidence for the 
first identification. Instead of merely appealing to the fact that no other kind of rules 
is mentioned in the essay, some positive reason should be provided. Usually, 
supporters of this identification argue that the standard of taste consists in a set of 
rules of art. If this is what Hume thinks, then the identification is strongly supported 
by the characterisation of a standard of taste as a rule in paragraph 6. Therefore, we 
should determine whether it is the case that the standard of taste consists in a set of 
rules of art. 
Given the interpretation we have developed so far, we can see why the standard 
of taste does not consist in a set of rules of art: the two items perform different 
functions. General rules of art are generalisations of our experience of what we have 
observed to please or displease generally. They concern what is beautiful. On the 
other hand, standard of taste concern the operation of taste, which help us to 
determine when our taste can be trusted in judging beauty. The very concept of rules 
of art itself does not impose any restriction on who can form such generalisations. 
Indeed, both true judges and critics with defective taste can form rules of art on the 
basis of their experience. We have no reason to suppose that those with defective 
taste will have completely chaotic artistic experience. Insofar as there can be a 
certain degree of regularity in their experience, it is sufficient for their imagination to 
form some general rules. With these general rules implicitly or explicitly in mind, 
they are then able to identify the possible causes of their pleasure or displeasure, just 
as true judges do.  
If we compare the two sets of rules of art, that of the true judges and that of 
those inferior critics, we need some standard to decide which set is better. However, 
this standard cannot itself be another set of rules of art, because we would then be 
required to find some further standard to establish its authenticity. Hume’s proposal 
is that we should judge these set of rules of art by judging the taste of the respective 
groups of critics, and only the sets of rules of art formed by true judges will be 
established. Some general rules concerning the operation of taste which correspond 
to the five traits of true judges have been discussed in Chapter 10, and in Chapter 11 
we have seen in what sense the joint verdict of true judges is both the true standard 
28 Wieand is right in saying that they are actually the same, but are only referred by different labels 
depending on the purpose of their employment (Wieand 1984, p. 131). Following him, the expression 
‘rules of art’ will be used throughout our discussion. 
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 of taste and of beauty. For the problem in hand now, it is sufficient to have 
acknowledged the different roles performed by the standard of taste and rules of art. 
It has seldom been noticed that beauty and taste require different kinds of 
judgements. This confusion of the two kinds of judgement might explain the worry 
concerning the fallibility of particular rules of art. Hume explicitly holds that if the 
prediction drawn from a rule of art disagrees with the actual sentiment felt by critics 
with sound taste, then the rule should be revised or abandoned. Together with the 
view that the standard of taste is a set of rules of art by which various sentiments are 
confirmed or condemned, it is not clear whether sentiment or rules of art should be 
taken as more authoritative. Even if we grant that, for true judges, there is no 
discrepancy between the sentiment felt and the prediction drawn from rules of art, 
there is still a difficulty. Unless a critic has been established as a true judge, she 
would have no idea whether she should trust her sentiment or the prediction of some 
rules of art she holds. It has to be explained how a certain set of rules of art could be 
established as correct, from which a standard of taste can be derived. One possibility 
is to argue that only those provided by true judges should be accepted; but we have 
seen in Chapter 10 that we cannot determine whether a critic is a true judge, and 
even if we put aside this problem, without distinguishing the different task of judging 
beauty and judging taste, this view might then be trapped in a circle by saying that 
true judges are those who judge according to the correct rules of art, or that the five 
traits of true judges are what make them judge according to the correct rules of art. 
In contrast, our interpretation, which does not take rules of art as constituting 
the standard of taste, does not suffer from the same difficulty. According to our 
interpretation, judgements of beauty are not made with any reference to rules of art; 
rather, we ensure that the operation of our taste conforms to the standard of taste, and 
then we judge the beauty of an artwork according to our sentiment. The authority of 
sentiment as the ultimate standard of beauty is preserved. We do not need to be 
worried by any conflict between particular rules of art and our sentiment, as those 
rules do not constitute any standard by which sentiment are judged. The use of rules 
of art is just to help us identify the true cause of our sentiment. When correctly 
formed, they connect our private sentiment to its cause which is publicly accessible. 
With these rules, we are able to discuss the beauty or deformity of artworks, so that 
we could convince our opponents or detect pretenders. 
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 With these considerations, it seems we have a strong reason to reject the view 
that the standard of taste consists in a set of rules of art. We can now move on to the 
second identification, that is, the identification of ‘decision’ in paragraph 6 with 
‘joint verdict’. In order to reject this identification, we have to clarify the relation 
between ‘rule’ and ‘decision’ in paragraph 6. As suggested by Wieand, this relation 
might be interpreted in two ways: first, the standard of taste is a rule by which 
sentiments may be reconciled, or in cases where the sentiments are not reconciled, 
this rule may at least afford a decision which confirms and condemns the various 
sentiment; or second, the standard is either a rule or a decision (Wieand 1984, p. 
130).  
Wieand rejects the first interpretation because he thinks that it wrongly ‘marks 
off reconciliation from the confirming and condemning of sentiments’ (ibid.). If he 
has understood it correctly, then we should agree with him, but it is not clear why 
this interpretation should be understood in this way. It could be consistently 
understood as saying that the rule always affords a decision which confirms and 
condemns various sentiments, while sometimes something extra also happens, that is, 
the reconciliation of sentiments. Understood in this way, the reconciliation is not 
marked off from, but rather based on the confirmation and condemnation of various 
sentiments. This is a much more natural way to understand the word ‘reconciliation’.  
On the other hand, Wieand thinks that the second interpretation implies that 
Hume might mean that ‘a reconciliation just is a confirmation or condemnation’ (ibid, 
p. 131). It is not clear why this follows; but if he is right, then this should be counted 
as a reductio of this interpretation, as this is not an acceptable understanding of 
‘reconciliation’. The second interpretation could be rejected on another ground. 
Assume for the sake of argument that this is the right interpretation, and consider the 
case in which the standard of taste is not a rule, but is a decision. Since the text tells 
us that the decision is afforded by something, so we should ask in this case what 
affords this decision which is also the standard of taste. It is difficult to answer this 
question, but for our purpose, we do not need to give a definite answer. For those 
who identify ‘decision’ with ‘joint verdict’, they could not answer that the decision is 
afforded by the joint verdict. Would it be afforded by some rules of art? No, because 
this would just be saying that there are some rules of art which afforded the standard 
as decision but themselves are not the standard. This should be rejected because if 
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 we ask here what could justify those rules of art to be something which could afford 
a standard of taste as decision, which is in turn identified as the joint verdict of true 
judges, this position will then appear to be claiming that the ideal and infallible 
verdict could be afforded by something fallible. This is a highly suspicious position 
and hence we should reject the identification of ‘decision’ with ‘joint verdict’ if the 
second interpretation were accepted. 
As we have rejected the first interpretation as understood by Wieand, the only 
alternative interpretation we have in hand is the revised version of the first 
interpretation suggested above, that is, that the standard as a rule always affords a 
decision which confirms and condemns various sentiments, while sometimes, 
reconciliation of sentiments might be achieved in addition. We might accept for the 
sake of argument the identification of ‘decision’ with ‘joint verdict’, and see what 
would follow. This interpretation says that the decision is afforded by a rule, so what 
is this rule? Again, this cannot be the joint verdict, as it should not be able to afford 
itself. We have also rejected the view that the standard of taste consists of rules of art. 
It seems there are only two possibilities remaining: the general rules concerning the 
operation of taste in terms of the five traits, or an actual standard of taste, which is 
the verdict of the best judge in a discussion.  
With regard to the first possibility, one might suggest that such general rules 
allow us to determine who the true judges are, and ‘afford’ their joint verdict. The 
problem of this suggestion is that neither our ideas of the five traits as perfections nor 
our comparative ideas of them are marks by which true judges or better judges are 
known. This has been shown in Chapter 10. We know who performs better on these 
five aspects only after we have already judged who has better taste; but if we have 
already know whose taste is better, even if we assume that we could then find the 
true judges by discussing with all critics in the world, we do not need those general 
rules to know the joint verdict. It does not make sense to say that they afford the joint 
verdict.  
As for the second possibility, it would mean that the joint verdict of true judges 
could be afforded by a fallible verdict of a less than perfect judge. Even if we allow 
that the infallible verdict can be somehow drawn from a fallible verdict, this would 
not fit with the concessive tone of the ‘at least’ in paragraph 6.  
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 As it seems the identification of ‘decision’ with ‘joint verdict’ renders 
paragraph 6 problematic under this interpretation and the second interpretation 
provided by Wieand, together with our rejection of his first interpretation as 
understood by him, we might conclude that unless there is some other interpretation 
of paragraph 6, the identification of ‘decision’ with ‘joint verdict’ should be rejected 
if paragraph 6 can be understood without this identification. 
We can now move on to the next step, that is, our account of how paragraph 6 
should be understood. The revised interpretation provided above—that the standard 
as a rule always affords a decision which confirms and condemns various sentiments, 
while sometimes, reconciliation of sentiments might be achieved in addition—will 
be adopted. What we need to do is to add more detail to it in order to fully 
understand it. The proposal is that, the word ‘rule’ here means what we call ‘a ruling’ 
nowadays. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as ‘[a]n order made by a judge 
or court with reference to a particular case only’ (Definition 4.a, ‘rule, n.1’). This 
meaning is rarely used nowadays outside legal contexts, but it was used more often 
in Hume’s age. It should not be surprising that Hume might use it in this way, given 
that he studied law from 1726 to 1729. Moreover, in The Life of David Hume, the 
author, E. C. Mossner, tells us that ‘[i]n the end, Hume’s legal knowledge, both 
theoretical and practical, was not inconsiderable. … In short, David Hume was fully 
qualified to become an advocate’ (Mossner 1980, p. 55).  
In paragraph 6, Hume extends the meaning of ‘rule’ from legal context to the 
realm of beauty, and means by it a judgement of beauty made with reference to a 
particular case only. Understood in this way, a ‘rule’ is just the joint verdict of true 
judges when we talk about the true standard of taste, or a verdict made by the critic 
whose taste is the best in a discussion when we talk about an actual but fallible 
standard. In either way, a rule affords us a decision which confirms those sentiments 
which agree with it, and condemns those which disagree with it. Here, the word 
‘decision’ does not have any special meaning—it just means a decision. Sometimes, 
but not always, those critics whose sentiment is condemned are convinced by those 
whose sentiment is confirmed, so that the former view the artwork in a different way, 
and come to share the latter’s sentiment. Various sentiments are thus reconciled in 
virtue of the confirmation and condemnation of sentiments. However, there are bad 
critics who refuse to listen to others’ views and stick firmly to their own judgements. 
104 
 In such cases, we might still confirm and condemn different sentiments, but they are 
not reconciled. 
  
105 
 Conclusion 
 
We have gone through a long journey in developing our interpretation of Hume’s ‘Of 
the Standard of Taste’. I should end by recapitulating some key features of this 
interpretation. 
 We started with an overview of some key feature of Hume’s philosophy in Part 
I. In Chapter 1 we highlighted his experimental method. This method is supported by 
his view on the limit of experience. We introduced in Chapter 2 the basic categories 
of items within this limit. Such items are the materials on which human mind 
operates. Two kinds of mental operations were discussed afterward: the formation 
and application of general rules in Chapter 3, and sympathy in Chapter 4. Lastly, this 
part ended with an attempt in Chapter 5 to clarify the distinction between two 
principal parts of human nature: reason and the passions. 
 Part II narrowed down our focus on Hume’s aesthetic thought. Chapter 6 
surveyed a few distinctions between different senses of ‘beauty’, among which the 
distinction between sentiment-view and the quality-view is the central one. Chapter 7 
tried to explain what judgements of beauty are, but failed to address the question 
how critics identify the true cause of their sentiment of beauty. In the meantime, we 
brought forth the importance of judgements of taste, understood as judgements which 
concern the soundness of the operation of taste, rather than those which are made in 
virtue of taste, such as judgements of beauty and moral judgements. 
 Part III is the place where we started the construction of our interpretation of 
‘Of the Standard of Taste’. A summary of the essay is given in Chapter 8. Relatively 
large amount of effort was spent on the earlier part of the essay in order to search for 
Hume’s aim in writing it: to supply a philosophical analysis of the commonsensical 
view that ‘the taste of all individuals is not on an equal footing’ and can be evaluated. 
This finding illuminated the structure of the whole essay, and facilitated our 
succeeding discussion. Part 9 is an attempt to unveil the nature of art criticism in 
light of Hume’s thought. It showed that, contrary to the common reading of the essay, 
we can evaluate different judgements of beauty before we know which critic is better. 
It also involved a digression on the role of general rules of art, which showed that 
their main role is to help critics in identifying the possible causes of their sentiment 
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 of beauty. We found that it is also one of the functions of taste to single out the true 
cause among the possible causes. 
As we moved on to Chapter 10, we turned to Hume’s idea of true judges and 
their five traits. We demonstrated the seemingly devastating impossibility of 
knowing such a preferable character. The true standard of taste and beauty which is 
identified by Hume as the joint verdict of true judges is thus shown to be useless. 
However, in Chapter 11, we introduced Hume’s idea of an imaginary standard. We 
argued that the true standard of taste is indeed an imaginary standard by giving a 
genesis of the idea of it. This discovery showed that although the true standard of 
taste is useless, this does not prevent Hume from achieving his aim in the essay. 
The first half of Chapter 12 clarified Hume’s freedom-from-prejudice 
requirement; while the second half resolve the apparent tension between this 
requirement and the two blameless sources of variation. A better understanding of 
how sympathy works in our judgements of beauty was thus acquired, and further 
enhanced by our solution for the problem of moral prejudice presented in Chapter 13. 
This solution relies heavily on the difference between natural relations and 
philosophical relations provided in Chapter 2. 
Finally, in Chapter 14, we responded to four controversies concerning Hume’s 
essay. We discussed in turn Levinson’s ‘Real Problem’, the charge of circularity, the 
question whether true judges are real or ideal, and the suggestion of Hume’s gives 
two standards of taste. The responses provided to these four controversies are 
grounded firmly in our interpretation, which is significantly based on resources from 
Hume’s major philosophical works. The success of these responses will add 
plausibility to our interpretation; or, at least, it will show the advantage of all similar 
interpretative strategies which integrate ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ with Hume’s 
system. 
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